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Franchisors often impose exhaustive operational standards on
franchisees, and enforce those standards by restrictingthe mobility of their
franchisees and their franchisees' employees. But courts often ignore
mobility limits when applyingjoint employer doctrine. This Article argues
that courts and agencies should be more likely to find, and presume, that
franchisorsand theirfranchisees arejoint employers underfederal and state
employment law based on proof that a franchisorrestricts the mobility of
franchisees or their employees. In so doing, this Article traces how the
Chicago School's efficiency arguments in favor of relaxing antitrust law
enforcement of vertical restraints developed into a presumption that
franchisorsare notjoint employers, despite modern antitrust law litigation
showing that mobility restraints can harm workers. It concludes that
preventing franchisor-imposed mobility restraintsfrom harming workers
will require courts, legislatures, and agencies to center subordinatefirm
dependency on lead firms in the joint employer doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION

Some companies shape the working conditions of their subordinate
firms'1 employees by preventing those firms from operating
independently and restricting how easily those firms' employees can
obtain work elsewhere. Large franchisors, such as McDonald's and
Domino's Pizza, contract with franchisees - often recruiting small
proprietors who only run a franchise store - by including terms in their
franchise agreements that encompass all aspects of a store's operation.
Franchisors often require franchisees to pay fees and make upfront
capital investments in franchise stores. 2 They often restrict franchisees
from operating businesses that compete with the franchisors, even after
the franchise agreement expires. 3 Some require "no-poaching"
agreements that bar franchisees from hiring other franchise stores'
employees. 4
These and other mobility limitations5 make subordinate firms depend
on a lead firm (here, the franchisor) for economic survival, and thus
afford franchisors significant power to shape franchisee workplaces in
ways that tend to harm workers. For example, franchisors often provide
franchisees with pay and supervision policies without explaining the
legal obligations triggered by them. Although franchisors nominally
"recommend" these policies, franchisees nonetheless follow them
because they need the franchisor's approval for their survival. 6 In turn,
these franchisees are less likely to comply with employment law. 7
I I use the term "subordinate firm" to describe a company that a lead firm contracts
with to provide the lead firm's product or service to customers, instead of directly
providing the product or service itself. While focused on the franchise relationship, this
relationship is similar to other subcontracting relationships, such as between large
retailers and small transportation and warehousing companies.
2 Andrew Elmore, FranchiseRegulationfor the FissuredEconomy, 86 GEO. WASH. L.

REV. 907, 919-20 (2018).
3 Andrew Elmore & Kati L. Griffith, FranchisorPower as Employment Control, 109
CALIF. L. REV. 1317, 1343 (2021).
4 loana Marinescu & Eric A. Posner, Why Has Antitrust Law Failed Workers?, 105
CORNELL L. REV. 1343, 1385-87 (2020).
5 By mobility limitations, I mean to refer not only to vertical restraints under
antitrust law, see Warren S. Grimes, Brand Marketing, IntrabrandCompetition, and the
MultibrandRetailer: The Antitrust Law of Vertical Restraints, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 83, 83 n.1
(1995), and contractual restrictions that limit labor mobility, see Orly Lobel, Gentlemen
PreferBonds: How Employers Fix the Talent Market, 59 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 663, 666-85
(2020), but also any other kind of lead-firm practice that causes subordinate-firm
dependency.
6 Elmore & Griffith, supra note 3, at 1346-55.
7 See DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE 9 (2014) (franchising can facilitate
legal violations by subjecting franchisees to such onerous operational standards that the
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Many franchisees are undercapitalized and violate employment law at
higher rates than franchisors.8 Particularly if the franchisee is judgment
proof, the ability of franchise store employees to vindicate employment
law rights hinges on the joint employment doctrine. Under it, a
company has joint and several liability for its subordinate firm's
violations of employment law if that company exerts sufficient control
over the terms and conditions of that firm's workforce. 9 Mobility
restraints can be central to how franchisors control franchise store
workplaces.10 But in applying that doctrine, because of joint employer
doctrine's indeterminate" and often-narrow focus on "control," courts
often ignore mobility limitations as evidence of control,12 especially for
lead firms in sectors in which contracting out for labor is common.1 3
Courts using this test have discounted even substantial indirect control

only way to increase profit is reducing labor costs); see also Elmore, supra note 2, at
927; Alan B. Krueger & Orley C. Ashenfelter, Theory andEvidence on Employer Collusion
in the FranchiseSector (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,Working Paper No. 24831, 2018).
8 Mark D. Easton, Andrea M. Noack & Leah F. Vosko, Are FranchiseesMore Prone
to Employment Standards Violations than Other Businesses? Evidence from Ontario,
Canada,32 ECON. & LAB. RELS. REV. 39, 52-54, 56 (2020); Elmore & Griffith, supra note
3, at 1321.
9 See infra Part lB.
10 Kate Griffith and I presented empirical findings from fast food franchise contracts
that many franchisors require their franchisees not to operate competitive businesses
during the term of the agreement, and nearly all franchisors have the uniform lateral
right to terminate the franchise agreement and forbid the franchisee from competing
with the franchisor afterward. Elmore & Griffith, supra note 3, at 1324, 1343-46, 1368.
Brian Callaci, an economist, similarly found a wide range of franchisor contractual
limitations on franchisee operations. See Brian Callaci, What Do FranchiseesDo? Vertical
Restraints as Workplace Fissuringand Labor Discipline Devices, 1 J.L. & Pot. ECON. 397,

407 tbl.2 (2021).
11 See Noah D. Zatz, Beyond Misclassification: Tackling the Independent Contractor
Problem Without Redefining Employment, 26 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 279, 281 (2011)
(explaining that "the agency law test for employee status itself is notoriously vague and
indeterminate," enabling employers to restructure operations to avoid liability). This
can also result in inconsistent outcomes. Compare Torres v. Air to Ground Servs., Inc.,
300 F.R.D. 386 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (considering quality control inspections as evidence
of joint employer status), with Lepkowski v. Telatron Mktg. Grp., 766 F. Supp. 2d 572,
579 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (discounting evidence of quality control in joint employer
analysis).
12 See infra Part I.B; see, e.g., Patterson v. Domino's Pizza, LLC, 333 P.3d 723, 739
(Cal. 2014) (disregarding evidence of franchisor control to create a presumption against
franchisor joint employment).
13 See infra Part IB; see, e.g., Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 75 (2d Cir.
2003) (concluding that "supervision with respect to contractual warranties of quality
and time . .. has no bearing on the joint employment inquiry ... ").
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by franchisors over franchisees' employees.1 4 Even worse, some courts
presume that franchisors cannot be joint employers.1 5 This can erode
not only legal compliance but also encourage companies to shift to a
subcontracting relationship as a form of regulatory arbitrage.16
Relatively few commentators have identified what mobility
limitations (contractual or otherwise) imply for joint employment
status in employment law. Hiba Hafiz stresses buyer market power 7 as
essential to joint employer analysis under the National Labor Relations
Act ("NLRA").18 Unlike many sources of employment law, however, the
NLRA's bar on "unfair labor practices" can typically only be enforced
by an agency-initiated administrative adjudication process by the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board).1 9 As a result, Hafiz's

proposal to "integrat[e] social scientific methods and research into an
administrable equal bargaining power standard," 20 is primarily directed
to the Board and appellate courts that review that agency's actions. 21
Outside the NLRA, others have argued that employer obligations for
14

See Elmore & Griffith, supra note 3, at 1328-33.
15 See Patterson, 333 P.3d at 739.
16 See Veena B. Dubal, Winning the Battle, Losing the War?: Assessing the Impact of

MisclassificationLitigation on Workers in the Gig Economy, 2017 Wis. L. REV. 740, 79092; Kate Conger, Uber and Lyft Consider Franchise-LikeModel in California,N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.con2020/08/18/technology/uber-lyft-franchisecalifornia.html [https://perma.cc/G9DG-HJAM].
17 1 use the term "buyer market power" to refer to an employer's market power to
suppress employee wages to a sub-competitive level. Labor and antitrust law and
economics scholarship also use the terms "employer market power," "monopsony
power," and "labor market power," as synonyms. These terms are broader than the
definition of "monopsony" in section 2 of the Sherman Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018);
see also Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 320
(2007).
18 Hiba Hafiz, Structural Labor Rights, 119 MIcH. L. REV. 651, 713 (2021). This is
aligned with Griffith's and my argument that labor and employment laws must take
account of power disparities in the employment relationship. See Elmore & Griffith,
supra note 3, at 1356-61.
19 See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 1527, 1553, 1552 (2002).
20 Hafiz, supra note 18, at 703.
21 See id. at 713 (proposing that the Board "define 'employer' or 'joint employer' to
include all those with buyer power, direct or indirect, over workers' labor inputs"). Because
this Article is primarily directed at how trial courts should interpret the joint
employment standard, this Article does not expressly consider the joint employment
standard under the NLRA, although its prescriptions are equally applicable to the
Board's (and other agencies') joint employer definition. See infra Part IV.C. Callaci,
similar to Hafiz, suggested that courts and agencies consider "social scientific evidence"
of franchisors' market power over franchisees when deciding who counts as an
"employee" or "employer." Callaci, supra note 10, at 416-18.
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lead firms notwithstanding their control over workers can be justified
to avoid worker domination. 22 Griffith and I argued that courts should
consider a franchisor's "overall influence and power to co-determine the
23
work" in the joint employment analysis of labor and employment law.
This Article offers concrete ways to change joint employer doctrine
under federal and state employment law to better account for the
limited mobility of subordinate firms in employment relationships like
franchising. 24 In so doing, it goes further than prior commentary in
three ways.
First, it traces the genealogy of the judicial rationale for not treating
franchisors as joint employers to the Chicago School's efficiency-based
rationale to relax antitrust enforcement against vertical restraints in the
franchise relationship. 25 The Supreme Court adopted this reasoning by
the 1970s, finding that vertical restraints in franchising can encourage
26
intrabrand competition and benefit consumers. Franchisor attorneys
then reshaped this efficiency-based rationale as justifying a favored
judicial treatment of the franchise relationship in claims for harms that
occur in franchise stores. 27 This favored status is justified, franchisor
attorneys urge, because franchisees are independent entrepreneurs who
benefit from the franchisor's operational control. Courts have
increasingly accepted this rationale, and narrowly interpreted the
franchisor's liability, first in tort claims seeking to hold the franchisor
vicariously liable for harms to customers in franchise stores, and later
in joint employer employment law claims. This rationale, however, is
unsound. Its assumptions have been contradicted by courts, and
22 Brishen Rogers has argued, for example, that "employment duties are fair when
'economic dependence' and 'unequal bargaining power' are sufficiently great that
workers are at risk of domination." Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the Platform
Economy: Getting Back to Basics, 10 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 479, 500-03 (2016).
23 Elmore & Griffith, supranote 3, at 1368.
24

See id. at 1366-69.

25 See Sanjukta Paul, Antitrust as Allocator of CoordinationRights, 67 UCLA L. REV.
378, 394, 414-15 (2020); infra Part II.A.
26 See, e.g., Cont'l TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54 (1977) (stating
that vertical restraints can "promote interbrand competition by allowing the
manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of his products"); see
also Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889-92 (2007)
(finding that setting minimum prices on retailers can improve efficiency and interbrand
competition).
27 As Callaci explains, franchisor attorneys from the 1960s to the 1980s sought to
reduce antitrust law enforcement against franchisors, and then reduce other regulation
of the franchisors' economic control over franchise stores, including as a joint employer
under labor law. See Brian Callaci, Control Without Responsibility: The Legal Creation of
Franchising,1960-1980, 22 ENTER. & Soc'Y. 156, 165-74 (2021).
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franchisors themselves, in recent antitrust law litigation. 28 Rejecting this
presumption can reduce inequality of bargaining power, 29 and advance
social equality 30 and the remedial goals of employment law and
employment discrimination law. 31
Second, this Article shows how joint employer law can better capture
forms of subordinate-firm dependency beyond just weighing it as a
factor in favor of joint employer status. 32 This includes a presumption
that franchisors that significantly limit the mobility of their franchisees
are joint employers, 33 and extending the "ABC" test for "employee"
status, 34 which presumes an employment relationship, to the joint
employer inquiry. While some courts only consider the ABC test as a
measure of worker dependency on the putative joint employer, it is easy
to extend its "independent trade or business" prong as a measure of
subordinatefirm dependency.
Third, this Article can guide future statutory and regulatory reform.
It offers the ABC "independent trade or business" test in franchising and
similar relationships, and proposes that when a lead firm uses mobility
restraints such as non-compete and no-poaching agreements, it should

28

See infra Part

ILA.

29 Wage and hour law expressly seeks to reduce "inequality of bargaining power"
between employees and employers. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2018); Kati L. Griffith, The
FairLabor Standards Act at 80: Everything Old Is New Again, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 557,
558 (2019). See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, Consent, Coercion, and Employment Law,
55 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 409, 409 n.18 (2020) ("wage and hour laws could help
rectify these bargaining-power imbalances both directly (by mandating that pay not fall
below a certain rate) and indirectly (by helping to set societal expectations about what
is a fair wage)"). Courts have repeatedly recognized the purpose of wage and hour law
to address inequality of bargaining power between employers and employees. E.g., Tony
& Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Lab., 471 U.S. 290, 302 (1985); Brooklyn Sav. Bank
v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706-07 (1945); Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court,
416 P.3d 1, 32 (Cal. 2018).
30 Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 MICH. L. REV. 225,
230 (2013); see also Rogers, supra note 22, at 495, 502 (stating that employment law
and employment discrimination law secure individual "dignity or interpersonal
equality" and maintain an egalitarian political economy).
31 See Elmore & Griffith supra note 3, at 1321.
32 See, e.g., Salinas v. Com. Interiors, 848 F.3d 125, 139 (4th Cir. 2017) (declaring
that joint employer status depends on whether potential joint employers "share or
codetermine the essential terms and conditions of a worker's employment").
33 See infra Part IIB.
34 See infra Part IIl. The ABC test presumes employment status unless the putative
employer can show that the putative employee performs work free from control, in an
independent trade, and outside the defendant's usual business. Robert Sprague, Using
the ABC Test to Classify Workers: End of the Platform-BasedBusiness Model or Status Quo
Ante?, 11 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REV. 733, 748-49 (2020).
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be treated as a joint employer under a per se rule. Centering subordinate
firm dependency in the joint employer doctrine, moreover, will require
guidance from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), Department of Labor (DOL), and National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) about the effect of mobility limitations in joint employer
litigation. Agency guidance and coordination will also be necessary to
account for a lead firm's power to shape subordinate firm workplace
practices outside of judicially-recognized forms of control, including
the lead firm's buyer market power. Proving a company's buyer market
power in antitrust law requires expensive economic analysis 35 that most
36
employment-law plaintiffs and their lawyers cannot afford.
Accordingly, agency guidance is needed for how the joint employer
doctrine accounts for subordinate firm dependence on lead firms with
buyer market power, and how to assess buyer market power in joint
employer claims. 37
This Article, while considering a variety of economic relationships,
focuses on franchisors in the fast food sector. Fast food franchisors are
both exemplars of lead firms that use mobility restraints and central to

35 See Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner & Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for Labor
Market Power, 132 HARV. L. REv. 536, 548 (2018) (proposing that FTC and DOJ in
reviewing a proposed merger consider its harmful effects on workers by, after defining
the relevant market, estimating the increase in labor market concentration and decrease
in employee mobility, and then "econometrically estimatling] ... how a merger is likely
to change prices, quality, innovation, and so forth").
36

Antitrust suits often require substantial upfront costs for plaintiffs, especially in

economist expert fees. See Leah Nylen, FTC's Economics Witness Out, in New Blow to
Court Fight with Facebook, POLITICO (July 30,
2021, 3:40 PM EDT),
182
5
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/07/30/facebook-antitrust-suit-car-shapiro-50
(detailing $5.7 million FTC paid to economics
[https://perma.cc/A94E-RWMZ
consulting finn and economics expert in beginning stage of FTC antitrust suit against
Facebook). Class certification is, as a result, essential to finance private antitrust suits.
See Marinescu & Posner, supra note 4, at 1387 (financing no-poaching antitrust suits
in the fast food sector requires class certification because the low individual "damages
will not finance a single expert report on market conditions"). Requiring these
economic analyses would place insurmountable resource barriers on many private
plaintiffs in employment and employment discrimination suits given the low value of
many of these claims, the rise of mandatory arbitration with class waivers in
employment contracts, and the difficulty in showing market effects in litigation

involving an individual workplace. See Orly Lobel, Boilerplate Collusion: Clause
Aggregation, Antitrust Law & Contract Governance, 106 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming
2021) (manuscript at 35-48).
37 See infra Part 1V. This is similar to the proposal by Hiba Hafiz that the National
Labor Relations Board hire economists and consider buyer market power in labor law
joint employer determinations. Hafiz, supra note 18, at 703-11.
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the debate over joint-employer doctrine's reach. 38 Franchising is a
dominant form in some low-wage sectors, especially fast food, 39 and
companies in other sectors have converted to, or are considering,
franchising as a form of regulatory arbitrage. This analysis has
implications for other fissured industries in which contractors
indirectly shape the workplaces of their subcontractors, such as large
retailers that integrate delivery and warehousing personnel into their
production process.49
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains how mobility
limitations bind subordinate firms to the lead firms' operational
standards, taking the franchise relationship as a main example. It will
then reveal that courts often ignore mobility limitations in joint
employment inquiries and sometimes presume that franchisors are not
joint employers.
Part II traces the genealogy of judicial indifference to mobility
restraints in the joint employment doctrine to Chicago School efficiency
arguments in favor of relaxing antitrust law enforcement against vertical
restraints. It will show that the assumptions grounding arguments that
the franchise relationship should not be regulated under work law, that
franchisees are entrepreneurs who benefit from franchisor mobility
restraints, are rejected by courts - and contradicted by franchisors' own
representations - in antitrust litigation. This shows how unsound it is
for judges to presume that franchisors are not joint employers. It will
propose centering subordinate firm dependency in the joint
employment test by presuming that franchisors that limit franchisee
mobility are joint employers.
Part III turns attention to the emerging trend of states presuming an
employment relationship in the ABC test. It will show why mobility
limitations justify extending the ABC test to the joint employment
relationship, and propose an interpretation of the ABC test in which its

38 WEIL, supra note 7, at 122-24; Andrew Elmore, The Future of Fast Food Governance,

165 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 73, 73-74 (2017), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1186&context=penn_law

reviewonline [https-//perma.cc/59CN-

FHVD].

&

39 See Elmore & Griffith, supra note 3, at 1318 & n.1 (reporting that nearly half of
all franchisee employees work in the fast food sector, and that fast food franchise store
employees "are among the lowest paid workers in the United States").
0 See, e.g., Edmonds v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. C19-1613JLR, 2020 WL 1875533,
at *4-6, *17-18 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 15, 2020) (finding that Amazon can jointly employ
subcontractor delivery employees); Carrillo v. Schneider Logistics Trans-Loading
Distrib., Inc., No. 2:11-CV-8557-CAS, 2014 WL 183956, at *12, *16 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14,
2014) (holding that Wal-Mart can jointly employ subcontractor warehousing
employees).
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"independently established trade" prong is a measure of subordinate
firm dependence.
Part IV concludes with three proposals to address mobility limitations
in ways unaccounted for in current doctrine: (1) federalizing the
"independently established trade" test; (2) establishing a per se rule that
lead firms that impose mobility restraints on subordinate firms are joint
employers; and (3) agency enforcement, guidance, and coordination to
reduce the harmful effects of mobility limitations on workers.
I.

MOBILITY IN THE JOINT EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE

This Part identifies mobility restraints that lead firms, such as
franchisors, impose on their subcontractors as an independent source
of power that can enable lead firm control over the workplace, and
shows how courts routinely discount evidence of this power.
A.

Mobility Limitations as Mechanisms to Bind Subordinate to Lead
Firms, Which Can Harm Workers

Large companies have increasingly "fissured," or split apart their
operations, often contracting out work through complex chains of
41
organizations to cut down on labor costs. Fissuring has created layered
employment relationships for these workers. At the top of a layered
employment relationship, the lead firm creates standards that workers
must follow to provide uniform products and services to customers. At
the bottom, "the actual liability, oversight, and supervision of the
42
workforce become[s] the problem of" one or more subordinate firms.
Franchising, in which the lead firm, a franchisor, contracts with
franchisees, or subordinate firms, to provide a uniform, licensed
product or service in chain stores in geographically dispersed markets,
is a leading form of fissuring in the fast food sector. The typical fast food
franchisor indirectly operates chain stores through small proprietors
they contract with, franchisees, by embedding exhaustive operational
43
standards in standardized contracts called franchise agreements.
To overcome principal/agent problems that can arise in contracting
out the responsibilities of supervising a large workforce to subordinate
firms, lead firms establish mechanisms to effectively monitor and
enforce their standards. 44 For many fast food franchisors, limiting

supra note 7, at 8.
Id. at 9.

41
42

WEIL,

43

Elmore, supra note 2, at 909, 913-15.

44

WEIL,

supranote 7, at 63-64.
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franchisee mobility ensures franchisee compliance with their
operational standards. Franchisors often recruit and retain
undercapitalized, unsophisticated franchisees, and require capital
investments in franchise stores. 45 Franchisors also often limit the
franchisee's ability to compete with the franchisor while or after
operating a franchise store. 46 By selecting sole proprietors that cannot
easily absorb the losses of franchise termination, and by limiting the
ability of franchisees to operate independently, franchisors ensure
compliance with exhaustive operational standards in franchise
agreements. 47

Franchisors can use the limited mobility of franchisees to shape
franchisee workplaces. Sometimes mobility restraints directly control
franchise store employees, as in franchisor no-poaching agreements
prohibiting franchisees from hiring the franchisor's or each others'
employees. 48 This effectively prevents franchise store employees from
seeking better conditions in other stores. But more often, franchisors
limit franchisee mobility to indirectly control franchise stores.
Franchisor operational standards often reach deep into the employment
relationship, requiring specific background qualifications, work hours,
job responsibilities, training, dress, and personal appearance.
Franchisors also often provide other personnel recommendations and
tools encompassing staffing, supervision, and pay, which franchisor
representatives and inspectors expect that franchisees use. 49 By limiting
franchisee mobility, franchisors ensure that franchisees comply with
these standards.
To be sure, indirectly controlling subordinate firm workplaces by
fostering subordinate firm dependency is not unique to franchising, and
mobility limitations are not the only means by which franchisors can
control franchise store operations. But franchisee dependence is a

45 Elmore, supra note 2, at 919-20; see also Robert W. Emerson & Uri Benoliel, Are
Franchisees Well-Informed? Revisiting the Debate over Franchise Relationship Laws,
76 ALBANY L. REV. 193, 205-07, 213 (2013).
46 Elmore & Griffith, supra note 3, at 1343-44 (finding that over a third of
franchisors prohibit franchisees from operating a competitive business during the term
of the agreement, and nearly all prohibit franchisee competition with the franchisor
after the franchise agreement ends).

47 See id. at 1339.
48 Alan Krueger and Orley Ashenfelter found that half of fast food franchisors in
2016 required franchisees to sign no-poaching agreements that they would not hire each
others' employees. See Krueger & Ashenfelter, supra note 7, at 4; see also Callaci, supra
note 10, at 407 tbl.2 (finding that virtually all franchisors include a non-complete clause
in franchise agreements, and a no-poaching clause in a little over half of them).
49 Elmore, supra note 2, at 920-24.
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defining characteristic of the franchise relationship, and mobility
limitations bind franchisees to franchisor standards.5 0 Franchisee
dependence heightens the consequences attending noncompliance with
the franchisor's standards, by ensuring that termination and loss of
upfront capital effectively shut down the franchisees' business.
The limited mobility of franchisees in the franchise relationship can
also harm workers. Operational costs, imposed by franchisors on
franchisees with limited ability to increase revenue, can suppress wages
and other working conditions. 51 Franchising can facilitate legal
violations by recruiting small, judgment-proof franchisees and
subjecting them to such onerous operational standards that the only
way to increase profit is reducing labor costs. 52 Unsophisticated,
judgment-proof franchisees also have little incentive to consider
whether franchisor recommended and required personnel policies
53
trigger employment and employment discrimination law obligations.
No-poaching agreements can also suppress franchise store employees'
54
work standards by prohibiting them from seeking better employment.
The effect of mobility restraints on working conditions has garnered
significant interest in antitrust law.5 5 Restraints imposed by franchisors
can violate the Sherman Act if "multiple franchisees in a single labor
market possess market power, and hence can suppress wages by
colluding." 56 Non-compete and no-poaching agreements can suppress

50 Id. at 919-22.
51 See Krueger & Ashenfelter, supra note 7, at 17.
52 See WEIL, supra note 7, at 9. Wage and hour law violations are more common in
franchise stores than franchisor-owned stores. MinWoong Ji & David Weil, The Impact
of Franchisingon Labor Standards Compliance, 68 INDUS. & LAB. RELS. REV. 977, 985
(2015). Franchisees are more likely to violate wage and hour law, and less likely to
repay owed wages, than comparable businesses. Easton et al., supranote 8, at 39-64.
53 Elmore, supra note 2, at 922, 927-31.
54 Marinescu & Posner, supranote 4, at 1385-88 (explaining theory of no-poaching
antitrust suits). See generally WELL, supra note 7, at 9 ("Laws that protect workers have
not kept pace with the new boundaries of the fissured workplace.").
55 Employers with buyer market power that suppress employee wages by restraining
employee mobility can violate antitrust law. Plaintiffs in antitrust suits seek to show
that there are horizontal elements of franchisor no-poaching agreements because of its
more favorable standard for plaintiffs, as I will explain infra Part II.A. See Andrele Brutus
St. Val, No-Hire Provisions in McDonald's FranchiseAgreements, an Antitrust Violation or
Evidence ofJoint Employer, 23 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 279, 283-301 (2020) (explaining
legal standard of antitrust law challenges to franchisor no-poaching agreements).
56 Naidu et al., supranote 35, at 598.
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the wages of employees by reducing those workers' mobility. 57 The
discovery of no-poaching agreements as a common feature of the
franchise relationship has led to a recent wave of antitrust litigation by
franchisee employees, and public agency enforcement, against fast food
franchisors.5 8 While some courts have dismissed these suits, 59 others
have found that franchisor no-poach agreements can be an unlawful
restraint. 60 State Attorneys General have since 2018 obtained
agreements with hundreds of franchisors to cease using no-poaching
agreements, including national fast-food franchisors. 61
57 See, e.g., id. at 545 (explaining the prevalence of employer-required no-poaching
and non-compete agreements, with the likely effect of "reduced mobility between jobs
and possible suppressed wages").
58 See St. Val, supra note 55, at 294-301 (discussing fast food no-poaching antitrust
litigation and Washington Attorney General enforcement).
59 These courts have dismissed no-poaching claims on the grounds that franchise
store employees have failed to adequately allege a cognizable injury, and that the
franchise relationship is entitled to firm immunity from Sherman Act liability. E.g.,
Arrington v. Burger King Worldwide, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 3d 1322, 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2020)
(dismissing Sherman Act claim because plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege that
franchisor "and its franchisees are separate economic actors for antitrust purposes");
Ogden v. Little Caesar Enters., Inc., 393 F. Supp. 3d 622, 639-40 (E.D. Mich. 2019),
appeal dismissed, No. 19-1986, 2020 WL 948507 (6th Cir. Jan. 28, 2020) (granting
motion to dismiss Sherman Act claim because of failure by plaintiff to adequately allege
a cognizable injury). Two courts have denied class certification in no-poaching claims
on the ground that plaintiffs could not meet the predominance requirement. See Conrad
v. Jimmy John's Franchise, LLC, No. 18-CV-00133, 2021 WL 3268339, at *9-11 (S.D.
Ill. July 30, 2021); Deslandes v. McDonalds USA, LCC, No. 17 C 4857, 2021 WL
3187668, at *15-16, *43 (N.D. Ill. July 28, 2021).
60 See Blanton v. Domino's Pizza Franchising LLC, No. 18-13207, 2019 WL
2247731, at *7 (E.D. Mich. May 24, 2019) (denying motion to dismiss, finding that
plaintiff adequately alleged that no-poaching agreement is an unlawful horizontal
restraint of trade); Conrad v. Jimmy John's Franchise, LLC, No. 18-CV-00133, 2019
WL 2754864, at *3 (S.D. Ill. May 21, 2019), motion to certify appeal denied, No. 18-CV00133, 2019 WL 4596762 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 2019) (denying motion to dismiss Sherman
Act claim); Yi v. SK Bakeries, LLC, No. 18-5627, 2018 WL 8918587, at *5 (W.D. Wash.
Nov. 13, 2018) (denying motion to dismiss). Before denying class certification, the trial
court in Deslandes found that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged an unlawful restraint. See
Deslandes, 2021 WL 3187668, at *6-7. As that court explained, a no-poaching
agreement between a franchisor and franchisee that operate competing stores in the
same geographic market can be a horizontal restraint that is ancillary to the franchise
agreement, and "unlawful under quick look analysis." Id. at *7-8.
61 The Washington Attorney General obtained agreements to cease using nopoaching agreements from over 200 franchisors. WASH. ATT'Y GEN.'S OFF., No-POACH
INITIATIvE

3, 6-9 (2020), https://agportal-s3bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploadedfiles/

Another/News/PressReleases/NoPoachReportjune202O.pdf
[https://perma.cc/35R6G9T4]. The Pennsylvania and Massachusetts Attorneys General led multi-state
settlements with seven fast food franchisors to end no-poaching practices. Press Release,
Pa. Att'y Gen. Josh Shapiro, AG Shapiro Secures Win for Workers as Four Fast Food
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But it remains unclear whether antitrust law, employment law, or
employment discrimination law can reach other employer practices that
restrain mobility in ways that harm workers. Despite the fact that the
widespread use of non-compete agreements by employers with buyer
market power can violate antitrust law, 62 and studies showing that noncompetes depress wages, employers commonly require them, even in
states that will not enforce them. 63 As Orly Lobel explains, most noncompete agreements are unchallenged, and antitrust law claims by
employees challenging a single contract often face an uphill challenge
in showing anticompetitive market effects. 64 Employment and
employment discrimination law, moreover, has not squarely considered
the implications of mobility limitations that harm workers. 65 While
subordinate firm dependency on lead firms can encourage violations of
employment and employment discrimination law, 66 practical problems
stunt the effectiveness of the private enforcement of employment and
employment discrimination laws. Especially with the rise of mandatory
arbitration with class waivers in employment, 67 the private enforcement
of employment and employment discrimination laws seems unlikely to
surface, much less challenge, the harmful effects of mobility limitations
on workers.

Chains Agree to End Use of No-Poach Agreements (Mar.
12, 2019),
https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/taking-action/press-releases/ag-shapiro-secureswin-for-workers-as-four-fast-food-chains-agree-to-end-use-of-no-poach-agreements/
[https://perma.cc/9LMH-HQJF]; Press Release, Mass. Att'y Gen. Maura Healey, Three
Fast Food Chains Agree to End Use of No-Poach Agreements (Mar. 2, 2020),
https://www.mass.gov/news/three-fast-food-chains-agree-to-end-use-of-no-poachagreements [https://perma.cc/S7MQ-WG861.
62 See Naidu et al., supra note 35, at 596 (analogizing antitrust analysis of
widespread use of non-compete agreements to successful antitrust law challenges to
"exclusive dealing relationships between finns with market power and independent
contractors").
63 Evan Starr, J.J.
Prescott & Norman Bishara, The Behavioral Effects of
(Unenforceable) Contracts, 36 J. L. EcON. & ORG. 633, 633 (2020).
64 See Lobel, supra note 36, at 34-36.
65 A state common law challenge of non-compete agreements, for example, typically
examines the reasonableness of the mobility restrictions on the individual employee and
does not consider the employer's buyer market power. Naidu et al., supra note 35, at

595-96.
See Elmore, supra note 2, at 927-32.
See Andrew Elmore, The State Qui Tam to Enforce Employment Law, 69 DEPAUL L.
REV. 357, 386-87 (2020) (explaining loss of enforcement of employment and
employment discrimination law with the rise of mandatory arbitration with class waiver
requirements in employment contracts, especially after Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.
66

67

Ct. 1612 (2018)).
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The next section will examine the current judicial trend of presuming
that franchisors do not jointly employ franchisee employees, which
underscores the need for courts to account for how mobility limitations
can heighten franchisee dependence as a form of control.
B.

The Need to Consider SubordinateFirm Dependence as a Form of
Control in the Joint Employment Doctrine

Whether a lead firm is co-liable for violations of employment and
employment discrimination law along with its subordinate firms
requires courts to apply a control-based, totality of the circumstances
joint employment test, 68 guided by a number of factors borrowed in part
from the common law of agency. 69 These factors evaluate the nature of
the economic relationship between lead and subordinate firms, and the
control that the lead firm has over the subordinate firm's employees.
Courts in applying this test typically distinguish between "direct" and
"indirect" control in the joint employment analysis. Here, indirect
control means control that is not exercised directly, through day-to-day
hiring, firing, supervision and pay, but through other means. Those
means can be difficult to discern, because they are often remote, or
reserved through contractual restrictions, but nonetheless shape
workplace practices. 70
The direct-indirect control distinction provides trial courts with
significant discretion in how to evaluate control. Where a court seeks
to narrow the standard, it primarily credits evidence of direct control
over hiring, firing, pay, and supervision. 7 ' The Third Circuit, for
68 See, e.g., Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1947)
(instructing that the remedial purposes of the law require a broad inquiry that "does
not depend on such isolated factors but rather upon the circumstances of the whole
activity").
69 Among the federal employment law statutes, only the Fair Labor Standards Act
expressly defines employment more broadly than the common law, in the "suffer or
permit" standard. See Griffith, supra note 29, at 579; see also Rogers, supra note 22, at
486. See generally Bruce Goldstein, Marc Linder, Laurence E. Norton, II & Catherine
K. Ruckelshaus, Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the Modern American Sweatshop:
Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Employment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1030-48
(1999) (discussing the historical origins of the "suffer or permit" language). The typical
judicial approach to this FLSA standard, however, only considers additional factors,
rather than using a different framework. See Frey v. Coleman, 903 F.3d 671, 676 (7th
Cir. 2018).
70 See Elmore & Griffith, supra note 3, at 1326-28.
7
Decisions by the Second and Ninth Circuits in the 1980s suggested this restrictive
interpretation of the joint employer test. See, e.g., Carter v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735
F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1984) (listing four factors: "(1) had the power to hire and fire the
employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of
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example, in In re Enterprise Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Employment
PracticesLitigation,72 while instructing courts to consider the totality of
the circumstances, directs courts to consider four narrow factors: "(1)
authority to hire and fire employees; (2) authority to promulgate work
rules and assignments, and set conditions of employment, including
compensation, benefits, and hours; (3) day-to-day supervision,
including employee discipline; and (4) control of employee records,
73
including payroll, insurance, taxes, and the like."
A broader standard, in contrast, shifts focus from lead firm control of
workers to additionally examine the lead firm's control of subordinate
4
firms. The Fourth Circuit in Salinas v. Commercial Interiors,7 for
putative joint employers
whether the
considers
instance,
"codetermine-formally or informally, directly or indirectly-the
75
essential terms and conditions of the worker's employment." Salinas
instructs courts to make this inquiry by assessing the subordinate firm's
relationship with the lead firm, including the degree of permanency and
duration of the relationship, and their shared management and physical
premises.76
While trial courts do not have unfettered discretion to credit or ignore
indirect control, 77 these two different approaches to the joint employer
78
doctrine can result in widely varying decisions. This indeterminacy

employment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment, and (4) maintained
employment records" (quoting Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465,
1470 (9th Cir. 1983))); Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470 (applying same test as Carter, 735
F.2d at 12).
72 683 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2012).
73 Id. at 469; see also Layton v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 686 F.3d 1172, 1178 (11th
Cir. 2012) (restricting control analysis to instance in which the putative joint employer
"begins to assign specific tasks, to assign specific workers, or to take an overly active
role in the oversight of the work" (quoting Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms, 20 F.3d 434,
441 (11th Cir. 1994))); Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining
Employment in the Modern Economy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1673, 1701-03 (2016) (discussing
Layton, 686 F.3d 1172, and trial court decisions applying a narrow version of the test).
74 848 F.3d 125 (4th Cir. 2017).
75

Id. at 141.

76 See id.
77 As a trial court held in rejecting a recent DOL final rule, the FLSA requires courts
to consider evidence of economic dependence of the subordinate entity on the lead firm.
See New York v. Scalia, 490 F. Supp 3d 748, 779 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting
Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 73, at 1693), appeal filed sub nom. New York v.
Walsh, No. 20-3806 (2d Cir. 2020).
78 Compare In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp. Pracs. Litig., 735 F. Supp.
2d 277, 338 (W.D. Pa. 2010), affd, 683 F.3d 462 (3d Cit. 2012) (finding "strong
presumption" that a parent corporation is not a joint employer of a subsidiary's
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has led courts to seek approaches to simplify the analysis. A technique
often used by courts is to summarily dispose of joint employer claims
involving economic relationships typically found not to establish a joint
employment relationship. In Zheng v. Liberty Apparel,79 in finding that
a garment manufacturer could jointly employ its subcontractor's
workforce, the Second Circuit nonetheless cautioned that not all
subcontracting arrangements "should attract heightened scrutiny." 80
Instead, courts should be "mindful of the substantial and valuable place
that outsourcing," 81 has in the United States economy. Courts, the
Second Circuit instructs, should apply less scrutiny to supervision "with
respect to contractual warranties of quality and time of delivery,"
because this "is perfectly consistent with a typical, legitimate
subcontracting arrangement."8 2
I will take up the instruction in Zheng that courts focus on the nature
of the economic relationship to decide the level of scrutiny to apply
indirect control in Part II(B). Here, I will focus on its suggestion that a
subcontracting arrangement is not a joint employment relationship if it
is routine or typical, which can be indifferent to lead firm power and
subordinate firm dependence. Others have criticized this reasoning for
enabling contractors to evade liability notwithstanding their control
over the subcontractor's workplace. 83 Hinging the relevance of
franchisor controls in a joint employer inquiry on the proportion of
franchisors that require them seems arbitrary and counterproductive. 84
A rule that franchisors are not joint employers unless the franchise
relationship is atypical encourages franchisors to adopt control
measures so long as they are typical, and obscures whether these
measures enable franchisors to control the franchisees' workplaces.
employees), with Flemming v. REM Conn. Cmty. Servs. Inc., No. 11CV689, 2012 WL
6681862, at *5-6 (D. Conn. Dec. 21, 2012) (rejecting presumption).
79 355 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2003).
80 Id. at 73.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 75.
83 As Keith Cunningham-Parmeter explains, this "absolve[s] businesses of liability
if they ha[ve] innocent motives for creating triangular employment relationships."
Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 73, at 1702.
84 For example, as of 2016, roughly half of franchisors required no-poaching
agreements. Callaci, supranote 10, at 407 tbl.2; Elmore & Griffith, supranote 3, at 1358
n.221. It seems arbitrary that a no-poaching agreement is only relevant in a joint
employment inquiry if roughly half is an insufficient proportion to make it a typical
feature of the franchise relationship. And it seems equally arbitrary that if ninety percent
of franchisors now decide to require no-poaching agreements, those agreements should
be disregarded because the practice is a "substantial and valuable" feature of franchising.
Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 73 (2d Cir. 2003).
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It is also contrary to established law. As many courts have held,
outsourcing of normal, routine work on a production line weighs in
favor of joint employer status because the worker is more likely to be
85
dependent on the lead firm's overall production process. The Second
Circuit in Zheng found this, instead, to weigh against heightened
scrutiny.

Courts have relied on Zheng to dismiss joint employer claims if the
86
proffered control is standard in that type of relationship or sector.
Some courts have even elevated this deference to "typical" economic
arrangements into a presumption of no joint employment, especially in
parent-subsidiary and franchisor-franchisee relationships. The Fifth
Circuit in Lush v. Foxmeyer Health Corp.87 rejected an employment
discrimination claim that a parent corporation jointly employed a
subsidiary's employee, finding that "[t]he doctrine of limited liability
creates a strong presumption that a parent corporation is not the
employer of its subsidiary's employees." 88 While some courts have
followed this presumption, 89 others have rejected it.90
Some courts reject the presumption against joint employment in
franchising. 91 But it is now common in the fast food sector, leading

85 E.g., Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1947); Torres-Lopez
v. May, 111 F.3d 633, 641 (9th Cir. 1997); Antenor v. D & S Farms, 88 F.3d 925, 937
(11th Cir. 1996).
86 See Lepkowski v. Telatron Mktg. Grp., 766 F. Supp. 2d 572, 579 (W.D. Pa. 2011)
(rejecting "detailed instructions and strict quality control" as evidence of joint
employment); Quintanilla v. A & R Demolitina, Inc., No. Civ.A. H-04-1965, 2005 WL
2095104, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2005) (same).
87 129 F.3d 773 (5th Cir. 1997).
88 Id. at 778.
89 See, e.g., Attanasio v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 863 F. Supp. 2d 417, 426 (M.D. Pa.
2012) (adopting the presumption that a parent corporation is not an employer); In re
Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp. Pracs. Litig., 735 F. Supp. 2d 277, 338 (W.D.
Pa. 2010), affd, 683 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2012) (dismissing FLSA claim against parent
corporation on this ground).
90 See, e.g., Flemming v. REM Conn. Cmty. Servs. Inc., No. 11CV689, 2012 WL
6681862, at *5 (D. Conn. Dec. 21, 2012) (finding that "high degree" of control in
parent-subsidary relationship justifies joint employer status); Hart v. Rick's Cabaret Int'l
Inc., No. 09 Civ. 3043, 2010 WL 5297221, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2010) (same);
Colindres v. QuitFlex Mfg., 235 F.R.D. 347, 363 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (acknowledging
presumption as a ground not to grant plaintiff motion for summary judgment on Title
VII joint employer claim against parent corporation, but permitting claim to proceed).
91 See, e.g., Johnson v. McDonald Corp., No. 20-CV-1867, 2021 WL 2255000, at *3
(E.D. Mo. June 3, 2021) (denying McDonald's motion to dismiss in a Title VII claim
that fast food franchisor is a joint employer). Courts appear more receptive to joint
employer claims against franchisor hotels and motels, for instance. See, e.g., Ocampo v.
455 Hospitality LLC, No. 14-CV-9614, 2016 WL 4926204, at *7-9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15,
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courts to ignore or minimize substantial evidence and allegations of
control. 92 The Fifth Circuit in Orozco v. Plackis,93 for example, found
insufficient evidence that a fast food franchisor trained the plaintiff, set
policies for the franchise store, and reserved the right to control
"selection, supervision, or training of personnel" in the franchise
agreement. 94 The Ninth Circuit, in Salazarv. McDonald's Corp., rejected
the franchisor's alleged participation in a Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) violation as evidence of a franchisor's joint employer status. 95
Federal and state trial courts in California and New York have rejected
similar challenges. 96
The presumption of no joint employment in franchising has created
a "safe harbor" 97 for franchisors, insulating them from liability so long
as they embed forms of control consistent with a "typical" franchise
relationship.
Eighteen states have gone even further, amending their state laws to
expressly exclude franchisors from state employment laws. 98 Some state
franchisor joint employer shield laws embrace the typicality framework
from Zheng as an exception to the state employment law exemption. 99

2016) (finding that allegations of indirect control are sufficient to defeat a franchisor's
motion to dismiss the joint employer claim).
92 See Jacobson v. Comcast Corp., 740 F. Supp. 2d 683, 690 n.6 (D. Md. 2010)
("Courts evaluating franchise relationship[s] for joint employment have routinely
concluded that a franchisor's expansive control over a franchisee does not create a joint
employment relationship [on its own].").
93 757 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. 2014).
94

Id. at 450-52.

95 944 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2019).
96 See In re Domino's Pizza Inc., No. 16CV2492, 2018 WL 4757944, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 30, 2018); Patterson v. Domino's Pizza, LLC, 333 P.3d 723, 738-39 (Cal. 2014).
97 As Griffith and I argue, this safe harbor "preclude[es] franchisor liability for labor
and employment law violations in franchise stores where there is no evidence of the
franchisor's direct hiring, firing, or supervision of employees." Elmore & Griffith, supra
note 3, at 1325.
98 Id. at 1336; see, e.g., IND. CODE § 23-2-2.5-0.5 (2021) (declaring that a franchisor
is not the employer of a franchisee or the franchisee's employees); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 337.010(1)(e) (2021) ("[Nleither a franchisee nor franchisee's employee shall be
deemed to be an employee of the franchisor .... "); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.0022,
61.0031 (2021) (deeming that a franchisor is not the employer of a franchisee unless it
exercises "a type or degree of control over the franchisee or the franchisee's employees
not customarily exercised by a franchisor for the purpose of protecting the franchisor's
trademarks and brand"); Wis. STAT. § 104.015 (2021) (same).
99 See Allison R. Grow & Adrienne L. Saltz, Effectiveness of the Legislative Response
to Joint Employer Liability, 37 FRANCHISE L.J. 349, 351-67 (2018) (discussing franchisor
shield laws in Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
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In Texas, as in Utah and Wisconsin, a franchisor is not a joint employer
unless it "exercised a type or degree of control over the franchisee or
the franchisee's employees not customarily exercised by a franchisorfor
00
the purpose of protecting the franchisor's trademarks and brand."
Similar to Trump-era administrative agencies, the franchisor-shield
laws of Michigan and Louisiana, in contrast, establish a safe harbor by
codifying a narrow control test. Those states, like the current NLRB
Trump-era rule, only permit a joint employment finding for franchisors
that "share" or "co-determine" the terms and conditions of employment
01
and "directly and immediately" control franchisee workplaces.1
The foreclosure of joint employment in franchising has enabled
franchisors to elide considerable and increasingly intensive forms of
control, especially through contractual restrictions and remote
monitoring and supervision.i 02 Other defendants in employment law
claims now seek a presumption that they are not joint employers
their
with
relationship"
"quasi-franchise
of their
because
subcontractors. 103 Companies concerned about their potential
employment law liability as direct employers have converted to a
franchise relationship, or have considered doing so, as a form of
regulatory arbitrage. After courts found that FedEx is an employer of its
drivers, for instance, FedEx responded by restructuring its operations
to a franchise system, once again shifting its operations outside of the
boundaries of employment.1 04 Uber has considered shifting to a
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming). As of 2018, Wisconsin and Utah
adopted the same typicality exemption as Texas. Id. at 371.
100 Id. (citing, in addition, UTAH CODE 31A-40-212(2) and Wis. STAT. 102.04(2r));
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.0022 (2021) (emphasis added).
101 Id. at 371 (citing LA. STATE. § 23:921 and MIcH. COMP. LAws § 418.120); Joint
Employer Status Under the National Labor Relations Act, 85 Fed. Reg. at 11186, 11198
(requiring a showing of 'possession and exercise of substantial direct and immediate
control over one or more essential terms and conditions of employment"'); see Elmore
& Griffith, supra note 3, at 1.367.
102 Elmore & Griffith, supra note 3, at 1328-33, 1337-55; Elmore, supra note 2, at
922. While franchising as an organizational form has existed for decades, the
contractual restrictions imposed by franchisors on franchisees have increased over time.
Elmore, supra note 2, at 922 & n.57.
103 Ambrose v. Avis Rent a Car Sys. Inc., No. 11-CV-09992, 2014 WL 6976114, at
*6-8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2014); see also Henderson v. Equilon Enters., 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d
738, 749 n.5 (2019), review denied, (Feb. 11, 2020) (finding persuasive Shell's argument
that its detailed operational control over its convenience stores "do not create a joint
employer relationship" because they are similar to the operational control embedded in
franchise agreements).
104 As Kenneth Dau-Schmidt explains, FedEx "has spent years losing cases and then
tweaking its operating system in an effort to claim that its drivers are independent
contractors rather than employees, and so exempt from coverage under the NLRA, and
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franchising model to avoid coverage under the broad "ABC" state
employment tests.1 05
The incentive that a control-based test creates for companies to shift
operations to avoid employment law liability has led scholars to
question whether control should serve as a benchmark for employment
status.1 06 This Article is aligned with this view, and will propose law
reform that does not depend on a finding of a franchisor's direct control
over franchise store workplaces in Parts III and IV. But, in the interim,
courts also need a principle to guide them in applying the control-based
test to joint employment claims against franchisors.
This Article proposes (in Part 11(B)) centering dependence in the joint
employment test. Subordinate firm dependence can create a
presumption of lead firm joint employer status.1 07 This approach is
consistent with the Fourth Circuit's instruction in Salinas to focus on
the nature of the relationship between the lead firm and its subordinate
firms.1 08 Replacing the Zheng typicality focus with subordinate firm

other federal and state laws." Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, The Impact of Emerging
Information Technologies on the Employment Relationship: New Gigs for Labor and
Employment Law, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 63, 79. FedEx has converted to an "independent
service provider" ("ISP") model, in which drivers "cover five service areas." Dubal,
supranote 16, at 790. ISP drivers who cover this territory typically hire their own drivers
and spend significant time managing, taking them (once again) outside the boundary
of employment. Id.

105 See Erin Mulvaney & Paige Smith, Uber, Lyft Won't Eliminate Legal Fights with
New
Business Models,
BLOOMBERG
L.
(Aug.
26,
2020,
2:46
AM),
https-//news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/uber-lyft-wont-eliminate-legal-fightswith-new-business-models [https://perma.cc/2EXD-Y9EK]. At writing, Uber has placed
those plans on hold as it seeks instead to lobby states to enact shield laws for
transportation network companies. Proposition 22, which exempts Uber from
California employment laws, has been found unconstitutional in trial-court litigation,
which is on appeal. Castellanos v. State, No. RG21088725, 2021 WL 3730951, at *2-5
(Cal. Super. Aug. 20, 2021). If upheld, Uber may shift back from a litigation to a
franchising strategy to avoid liability.
106

Veena Dubal and Noah Zatz critique a control-based test for enabling companies

to restructure operations in order to avoid a finding that they are employers. See Dubal,
supra note 16, at 794 ("The legal entitlement of firms to restructure their business model
undermines any redistributive power enabled by a judicial finding of employee status.");
Zatz, supra note 11, at 289 ("If a firm designs a work structure to achieve an
independent contractor designation, simply asking after the fact whether the workers
are employees or independent contractors misses the way that both the firm and the law
already set up the problem." (footnote omitted)). I have previously argued that a narrow
control-based joint employment test "fails to account for the franchisor's relationships
with franchisees and franchise store employees and can have the perverse effect of
encouraging employment law violations in franchise stores." Elmore, supra note 2, at 939.

107 Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 75 n.12 (2d Cir. 2003).
108 Salinas v. Com. Interiors. 848 F.3d 125. 139 (4th Cir. 2017).
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dependency can account for mobility limitations in the joint
employment analysis, dispel the presumption of no joint employer
status for franchisors, and remove incentives for firms to restructure
operations to a franchise relationship to avoid liability.

II.

MOBILITY LIMITATIONS AS DEPENDENCY IN THE JOINT EMPLOYMENT
DOCTRINE

To show why courts often ignore franchisor mobility restraints that
foster franchisee dependency in joint employment claims, this Part
begins with a genealogy of the judicial turn away from regulating the
franchise relationship. It begins with the Chicago School law and
economics movement in the 1960s. The Chicago School advanced an
efficiency rationale to relax antitrust law enforcement against franchisor
vertical restraints of franchisees.1 09 After the Supreme Court accepted
this rationale, removing most franchisor vertical restraints from
antitrust scrutiny, lawyers for franchisors repackaged it as a defense in
tort and employment law claims of franchisor liability for harm that
occurs in franchise stores. Courts, franchisor attorneys in these cases
argued, should protect the franchise relationship by narrowly
interpreting vicarious liability and joint employment standards. These
arguments succeeded in migrating a protective view of the franchise
relationship, justifying a presumption of no franchisor liability in
vicarious liability standards, and then again in employment
discrimination and employment law. This section will show that the
assumptions underlying the presumption against joint employer
liability, that franchisees are independent entrepreneurs who benefit
from the franchisor's operational control, are unwarranted. They are
most recently belied by court findings and franchisor representations in
current antitrust litigation. It will conclude that centering subordinate
firm dependency can guide the joint employer analysis. This approach
can justify a presumption that lead firms that limit the mobility of
subordinate firms are joint employers.
A.

The Genealogy of the Presumption that FranchisorsAre Not Joint
Employers

In the decade after the New Deal, the Supreme Court broadly
construed the employment relationship in the FLSA and NLRA and
embraced a purposive approach to defining the employment

109

Paul, supra note 25, at 394, 414-15.
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relationship in New Deal statutes.1' 0 But in 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act"'
amended the NLRA's definition of "employee" to expressly exclude
independent contractors." 2 After the 1960s, the Supreme Court
instructed courts to adopt the common law definition of "employee" for
any law in which the statute is silent or ambiguous about its
definition." 3
Neither change, however, explains why judges narrowed joint
employment doctrine across work law for franchisors. As Sachin Pandya
explains, while the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act was critical
of earlier precedent regarding the employment status of independent
contractors, it did not amend the NLRA to supplant the pre-1947 joint
employment doctrine."1 Congress, moreover, did not amend the
FLSA's definitions of "employer", "employee", or "employ"." 5 Thus,
the Supreme Court in 1947 held in Rutherford Food v. McComb,ll6 that
courts should use an "economic realities" test for FLSA that considers
whether the workers are integrated into the contractor's production
process." 7
The Supreme Court's clear-statement rule for the statutory term
"employee" also does not require a narrow joint employment test. The
common law of agency right to control test 118 considers a wide variety
of factors that elicit the agent's dependence on the principal, such as the
110 See United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713 (1947), abrogatedby Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992); NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, 322 U.S. 111, 126-28
(1944), overruled in part by Darden, 503 U.S. 318.
1I
Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2018).
112 Id. § 152(3) (amending the NLRA to note that the definition of an employee "shall
not include . .. any individual having the status of an independent contractor").
113 See Darden, 503 U.S. at 322-23; see also Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,
490 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1989); NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 260 (1968)
(applying common law definition of employment in interpreting NLRA).
"1
Sachin S. Pandya, What Taft-Hartley Did to Joint-Employer Doctrine, 25 EMP. RTs.
& EMP. Pot J. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 13-21).
115 See Goldstein et al., supra note 69, at 1015-102; Griffith, supra note 35, at 579.
116 331 U.S. 722 (1947).
n7 Id. at 726-37, 730 (finding that workers' work in contractor's production line, on
the contractor's premises and using the contractor's equipment, weigh in favor of joint
employment); see also Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633, 640 (9th Cir. 1997) (relying
on Rutherford in applying an "economic reality" test for FLSA).
118 The common law of agency "right to control" uses a "manner and means" test to
distinguish employees from independent contractors. The Restatement (Third) of
Agency Law instructs that an employer is subject to vicarious liability so long as the
employee "is an agent whose principal controls or has the right to control the manner
and means of the agent's performance of work," for torts by employees acting within
the scope of employment. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 (3)(a) (AM L. INST.

2006).
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agent's distinct occupation or business, skill required, time employed,
9
and whether the work is part of the principal's business.1 These factors
20
substantially overlap with the economic realities test.1 Many courts,
relying on these factors, have imposed vicarious (or apparent agency)
liability on companies in tort claims based on factors other than direct
control over the work.121
Instead, the judicial turn toward a narrow joint employment test, at
least in franchising, began with the Chicago School in the 1960s, which
proposed that relaxing antitrust law enforcement against restraints
made between entities at different levels of a supply chain, or "vertical"
22
As courts and
restraints, can promote interbrand competition.1
administrative agencies accepted this efficiency-based rationale,
franchisors repurposed this justification to persuade courts to adopt a
presumption of no vicarious liability for customer tort claims in
franchise stores, and later of no joint employer status under
employment and employment discrimination laws.
While courts often treat "horizontal" restraints, or agreements
between competitors at the same level of the market, as inherently
anticompetitive, and per se unlawful under antitrust law, they typically
23
apply the less exacting rule of reason standard to vertical restraints.1

§ 220(2) (AM L. INST. 1958).
120 As the Seventh Circuit acknowledged in explaining its version of the joint
employer test in Frey v. Coleman, 903 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 2018), "the 'economic realities'
test . .. is, in its essence, an application of general principles of agency law to the facts
of the case." Id. at 676.
121 See, e.g., Drexel v. Union Prescription Ctrs., Inc., 582 F.2d 781 (3d Cir. 1978)
(finding that factual issues preclude summary judgment on the vicarious liability and
apparent agency questions of whether the franchisor retained a right to control or held
out its franchisee as an agent); Estate of Anderson v. Denny's Inc., 987 F. Supp. 2d 1113
(D.N.M. 2013) (finding that franchisor's vicarious liability for franchisee's negligence
in wrongful death action by worker killed during robbery is an appropriate jury
question); Miller v. D.F. Zee's, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 792 (D. Or. 1998) (finding that the
franchisor has sufficient right to control); People v. JTH Tax, Inc., 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 728
(Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (affirming vicarious liability theory finding franchisor vicariously
liable for franchisee's illegal advertising that franchisor had the right to control).
122 The Chicago School, which is associated with the law and economics movement,
in the 1960s and 1970s promoted an economic standard of efficiency for antitrust law.
See Paul, supra note 25, at 414-15.
123 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885-94, 907
(2007) (describing horizontal agreements to fix prices or divide markets as per se
unlawful because they are inherently anticompetitive, while holding that vertical price
restraints are subject to the rule of reason standard, which permits restraints that courts
deem to be procompetitive); Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update
for the 21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REv. 827, 830 (2009) (examining 222 antitrust
claims over a decade in which courts applied rule of reason analysis, and finding that in
119 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
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This was not always the case. In the decades after the New Deal, courts
viewed vertical restraints with skepticism under antitrust law,1 2 and
vertical restraints remained of uncertain legality as late as the 1970s. 125
In United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,1 2 6 the Court held in 1967 that
a franchisor's vertical restraints can be per se illegal, casting doubt on
the legality of franchisor restrictions on franchisee territory, services,
and prices.12 7 Schwinn provoked fierce criticism from Robert Bork,
Frank Easterbrook, and Richard Posner, who argued in favor of
curtailing judicial scrutiny of vertical restraints.128 Citing Bork,
Easterbrook, and Posner, the Supreme Court reversed Schwinn and held
in Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania,129 that vertical restraints "promote
interbrand competition by allowing the manufacturer to achieve certain
efficiencies," in distribution.1 30 This efficiency rationale has largely
removed vertical restraints from antitrust scrutiny.131
Economists after Sylvania viewed franchising as an efficient
coordination of production outside the firm that should receive
deferential treatment under antitrust law. Economists beginning in the
1970s posited that firms franchised in the fast food sector instead of
all but one of these cases the plaintiffs lost, primarily because those courts found that
"the plaintiff failed to show an anticompetitive effect").
124 The Supreme Court first expressed skepticism about vertical territorial
restrictions in 1963 in White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), and
remanded the case for the trial court to determine whether to apply the per se illegal or
rule of reason standard. Id. at 263.
125 Callaci, supra note 27, at 164-69. See generally Paul, supra note 25, at 394-95
(explaining how the Chicago School worked to limit antitrust enforcement against
vertical restraints).
126 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
127 Id. at 379 (holding that after a manufacturer's sale of a product to a
distributor,
manufacturer territorial restraints are per se unlawful).
128 Posner argued that nonprice vertical restraints have no anticompetitive effect and
enhance interbrand competition. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme
Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential
Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 297 (1975) (explaining criticism of
Schwinn). Easterbrook went further, arguing that vertical price restraints, or "resale
price maintenance," should be permitted because they can be procompetitive by forcing
prices down, reigning in distributor market power. Frank H. Easterbrook, Maximum
PriceFixing, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 886, 890 n.20 (1981). Bork urged the Supreme Court to
"abandon its concern with such beneficial practices as ...
vertical price maintenance
and market division." ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 406 (1978).
129 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
130 Id. at 54.
131 In State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997), the Supreme Court found maximum
prices procompetitive. See id. at 22. By 2007, the Supreme Court eliminated the per se
rule for minimum price restraints. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,
551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007).
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directing managers in firm-owned stores because of the high monitoring
costs of remote supervision. 132 In this view, franchisees who operate as
agents of the franchisor can more efficiently monitor geographically
dispersed stores. Franchising as a solution to the "moral hazard" of
manager and employee shirking came to dominate economic theory of
why firms franchise. 133 This view was highly influential among
economists in the following decades,1 34 and accepted by antitrust
scholars who argued that vertical restraints can efficiently reduce
franchisee opportunism.1

35

The franchisor argument against regulation on efficiency grounds did
not stop with antitrust law, however. Franchisor attorneys sought to
extend this efficiency rationale to limit franchisor vicarious liability for
tort suits in franchise stores. 136 But extending efficiency as a defense for
claims against franchisors outside of antitrust law faced several
challenges. Fairness remained an important, competing value in the
franchise relationship, especially with the rise of state franchise statutes
37
prohibiting unfair and deceptive franchising practices in the 1970s.1
And even assuming that vicarious liability decreases efficiency, a

132 See Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise
Contract, 21 J.L. & EcoN. 223, 226-31 (1978).
133 See, e.g., Sugato Bhattacharyya & Francine Lafontaine, Double-Sided Moral
Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts, 26 RAND J. EcON. 761, 761-62 (1995)
(summarizing literature).
134 See James A. Brickley & Frederick H. Dark, The Choice of OrganizationalForm:
The Case of Franchising,18 J. FIN. ECON. 401, 420 (1987).
135 See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Barry D. Baysinger, Vertical Restraints of Trade as
Contractual Integration: A Synthesis of Relational Contracting Theory, Transaction-Cost
Economics, and OrganizationTheory, 32 EMORY L.J. 1009, 1092-93 (1983) (arguing that
franchisors restrain franchisee behavior "in order to deter franchisee shirking and
intrabrand free riding," and that market forces sufficiently deter franchisor
opportunism).
136 See, e.g., Kevin M. Shelley & Susan H. Morton, "Control" in Franchisingand the
Common Law, 19 FRANCHISE L.J. 119, 127 (2000) (urging that courts favorably view the
franchise relationship as enabling franchisors to protect their brands while promoting
franchisee entrepreneurialism). See generally William L. Killion, The Modern Myth of the
Vulnerable Franchisee: The Case for a More Balanced View of the Franchisor-Franchisee
Relationship, 28 FRANCHISE L.J. 23 (2008) (arguing that vicarious liability is undesirable
on efficiency grounds).

137 Jean Wegman Burns, Vertical Restraints, Efficiency, and the Real World, 62
FORDHAM L. REv. 597, 617-21 (1993) (arguing that "fairness concerns" animated the

enactment of state franchise laws in the 1970s, which protect "the franchisee ... from
unfair termination (or the threat of termination), overreaching, and arbitrary or
unethical business practices by an unscrupulous franchisor" (citations omitted)).
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contestable proposition,1 38 vicarious liability primarily turns on the
principal's control over the agent, 139 not the relationship's efficiency.
Nor does the franchisor's Lanham Act14 0 duty to supervise a registered
trademark insulate franchisors from vicarious liability.141 The Lanham
Act, as the Seventh Circuit held in rejecting this defense, "does not give
a licensor control over the day-to-day operations of a licensee beyond
that necessary to ensure uniform quality of the product or service in
question."1 42 This left open the question of under what circumstances a
franchisor's right to control franchisees and their workplaces creates an
employment relationship.1 43 For these reasons, courts up until the
1990s applied the law of vicarious liability unevenly to franchisors.144
By the 2000s, franchisor advocates understood that efficiency alone
was not enough to merit a presumption against vicarious liability for
torts in franchise stores. The "task," according to one set of franchisor
counsel writing in 2000, "is to convince the courts that the modern
franchise relationship is necessarily premised upon the imposition of
systemwide standards to ensure uniformity and quality," which creates
138 Vicarious liability can improve efficiency by inducing the principal to take
optimal care, particularly when violations are easily observable and agents are judgment
proof, and because principals can be superior risk bearers, if they are wealthier and can
more easily obtain insurance than agents. Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious
Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1235-39, 1244-46 (1984); see Lynn M. LoPucki, Toward a
Trademark-Based Liability System, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1099, 1115, 1118-19 (2002)
(proposing vicarious liability for franchisors on an efficiency basis, arguing that
franchisors can spread risk better than customers, and "the trademark owner - unlike
the customer - typically has both the opportunity and the bargaining leverage to
investigate and control the risk of insolvency").
139 Rogers, supra note 22, at 484-85.
140

15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141 (2018).

141 Drexel v. Union Prescription Ctrs., Inc., 582 F.2d 781, 785-86 & n.5 (3d Cir.
1978) (summarizing case law during this period holding that "the mere existence of a
franchise relationship does not necessarily trigger a master-servant relationship, nor
does it automatically insulate the parties from such a relationship").
142 Oberlin v. Marlin Am. Corp., 596 F.2d 1322, 1327 (7th Cir. 1979).
143 See Drexel, 582 F.2d at 790 (holding that disputed facts about extent of franchisor
control preclude summary judgment on issue of vicarious liability).
144 Compare id., and Miller v. McDonald's Corp., 945 P.2d 1107 (Or. Ct. App. 1997)
(finding that the franchisor's operational control and identification of store with
franchisor brand sufficed to create jury questions on actual agent and apparent agent
theories), with Cislaw v. Southland Corp., 4 Cal. App. 4th 1284 (Cal. App. 1992)
(finding that the franchisor did not sufficiently control operations to be vicariously
liable in negligence claim against franchisee). Franchise store employees may
independently claim that the franchisee is an apparent agent of a franchisor,
notwithstanding the franchisor's joint employer status. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 267 (AM. L. INST. 1958) (providing apparent agency standard); Elmore, supra
note 2, at 947-49.
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145
This beneficial
benefits for both franchisors and franchisees.
relationship, the authors argued, merits favorable treatment under
vicarious liability standards, limiting franchisors' liability to those rare
instances in which they exercise "day-to-day operational control" over
franchise stores.1 46
Joseph King, a law professor, advanced this position in a law review
article, arguing that "unique realities of present-day franchising,"
namely that franchisors control franchise store operations in order to
protect their brands, require a special rule narrowing vicarious liability
in franchising.1 47 For King, vicarious liability "overrides the freedom of
the parties to chart the parameters of their relationship and to enjoy the
benefits of that relationship, a type of business relationship that was
48
King assumed
never intended to be that of employer-employee."1
away the possibility of franchisors controlling franchise stores, finding
"doubtful" that the operational requirements, trainings, monitoring,
"add anything in the
and sanctions commonly required by franchisors
49
way of effective day-day-operational 'control."1
Courts in the 2000s came to adopt the franchisor's view of franchisees
as independent entrepreneurs who benefit from franchisor control,
requiring a presumption of no liability to avoid disrupting the franchise
relationship. This began as a limitation on franchisor vicarious liability.

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Kerl v. Dennis Rasmussen,150

announced an "instrumentality rule" for franchise relationships, in
which plaintiffs to establish a vicarious liability theory must show that
"the franchisor had control or a right of control over the daily operation
of the specific aspect of the franchisee's business that is alleged to have
caused the harm."151 The court reasoned that vicarious liability would
not otherwise induce efficient precautions because "[t]he typical
franchisee is an independent business or entrepreneur, often distant
from the franchisor and not subject to day-to-day managerial

145 Shelley & Morton, supra note 136, at 127.
146

Id.
147 Joseph H. King, Jr., Limiting the Vicarious Liability of Franchisorsfor the Torts of
Their Franchisees,62 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 417, 468 (2005). King argued, specifically,
that franchisors exercise control to protect their trademarks. Id. at 468-69. While
franchisor control extends to trademarks, franchisor measures to promote the brand
extend well beyond what the Lanham Act requires, and indeed beyond measures to
protect the franchisor's marks. See infra Part III.
148 King, supra note 147, at 470.
149

Id. at 470-71.

150 682 N.W.2d 328 (Wis. 2004).

151 Id. at 340, 342.
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supervision by the franchisor."15 2 The International Franchise
Association (IFA), the leading franchisor trade group in the United
States, relied on Kerl to urge widespread adoption of the instrumentality
rule in vicarious liability litigation.15 3 The Supreme Court of Maine in
Rainey v. Langen,154 while rejecting the instrumentality rule,
nonetheless held that the standard franchise relationship does not
establish sufficient control to establish vicarious liability.155 Most states
now follow these approaches.156
And from there, the IFA spread this conventional wisdom across
employment discrimination and employment law. Since 2013, the IFA
has argued as amicus curiae in joint employment litigation that limiting
franchisor liability benefits franchisees (and consumers) by permitting
the franchisor to control the quality and consistency of its products and
services.1 57 The California Supreme Court in 2014 adopted this
reasoning in Patterson v. Domino's Pizza,158 in establishing a
presumption against franchisor liability for sexual harassment in
franchise stores under state law. Citing opponents of franchisor
vicarious liability, the California Supreme Court in Patterson opined
that "[t]he franchisee is often an entrepreneurial individual who is
willing to invest his time and money, and to assume the risk of loss, in

152 Id. at 338.
153 Brief for Int'l Franchise Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 19-20,
People v. JTH Tax, Inc., 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 728 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (No. A125474),
2010 WL 3623052 (arguing that Kerl and similar courts reflect an understanding that
in modern franchising, franchisor controls are necessary to ensure product uniformity);
Brief for Int'l Franchise Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 14, Papa John's
Int'l, Inc. v. McCoy, 244 S.W.3d 44 (Ky. 2008) (No. 2005-SC-000614), 2006 WL
5402936 (urging adoption of the instrumentality rule).

154 998 A.2d 342 (Me. 2010).
155 Id. at 349-51.
156 See Elmore, supra note 2, at 933-34; see, e.g., Viado v. Domino's Pizza, LLC, 217
P.3d 199, 202 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that "to determine whether the franchisee
(and its employees) are the agents of the franchisor, we look to whether the franchisor
controls the day-to-day operations of the franchisee").
157 See Brief for Int'l Franchise Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 11, Patterson v. Domino's Pizza, LLC, 333 P.3d 723 (Cal. 2014) (No. S204543), 2013
WL 3809579 (arguing that courts should disregard controls "necessary to preserve and
enhance the quality and consistency of the products and services" in joint employment
litigation); Brief for Int'l Franchise Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 1617, Courtland v. GCEP-Surprise, LLC, No. CV-12-00349-PHX, 2013 WL 3894981 (D.
Ariz. July 29, 2013) (No. 13-17182), 2014 WL 3421247 (urging narrow joint
employment test to preserve franchisor controls to ensure consistency and uniformity
of brand products and services).
158

Patterson, 333 P.3d 723.
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9
order to own and profit from his own business."15 Quoting King, the
California Supreme Court accepted that the franchisors' "systemwide
standards and controls . . . benefit[] [both franchisors and franchisees]
. . . by ensuring consistency and uniformity in the quality of goods and
services, the dress of franchise employees, and the design of the stores
themselves."1 60 Given that the franchising relationship is arms-length
and benefits franchisees, the court held that a presumption against joint
employment in franchising is necessary because "[a]ny other guiding
16
principle would disrupt the franchise relationship." 1
Franchisors, having succeeded in extending vicarious liability
limitations to employment discrimination in Patterson, now assert its
relevance across all of work law.1 62 While in theory Pattersonconfined
its reasoning to employment discrimination laws that adopt vicarious
liability standards, courts have adopted it in wage and hour law claims.
The Ninth Circuit in Salazar v. McDonald's in 2019 rejected a wage and
hour law claim against the franchisor despite allegations that its payroll
63
software undercalculated franchise store employee owed wages.1
Citing Patterson, the court held that "involvement in its franchises and
with workers at the franchises is central to modern franchising and to
the company's ability to maintain brand standards, but does not

159 Id. at 733-34. In support of this statement, the Court cited an article by a
franchisor attorney who provided no authority for the proposition. See Killion, supra
note 136, at 28.

Patterson,333 P.3d at 733.
161 Id. at 739. Courts have taken this position to limit liability of franchisors for
160

allegations of tortious and discriminatory conduct by franchisees against customers. See
Chavez v. McDonald's Corp., No. 19-cv-00164 , 2020 WL 1322864, at *3-5 (D. Colo.
Mar. 20, 2020) (dismissing section 1981 claim by customer against McDonald's for
alleged discriminatory conduct by franchisee, because "to hold a franchisor liable
because of nationwide advertising and branding alone would result in virtually
unlimited liability against franchisors for the conduct of franchisees." (quoting
McKinnon v. YUM! Brands, Inc., No. 15-CV-00286, 2017 WL 3659166, at *9 (D. Idaho
Aug. 24, 2017))).
162 See, e.g., Brief for Int'l Franchise Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees
at 8, Salazar v. McDonald's Corp., 944 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2019) (No. 17-15673), 2018
WL 618494 (arguing against joint employment in a wage and hour claim because a high
level of franchisor control over franchisee operations is "the essence of franchise
business model"); Brief for Int'l Franchise Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Appellants at 3, Williams v. Jani-King of Phila. Inc., 837 F.3d 314 (3d. Cir. 2016) (No.
15-2049), 2015 WL 4480394 (arguing in the claim that the franchisor misclassified
commercial cleaners as independent contractors and that the "franchise business model
becomes unworkable if brand controls are treated as the controls of an employer over
an employee").
163 Salazar, 944 F.3d at 1032.
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represent control over wages, hours, or working conditions." 164 A New
York trial court, also citing Patterson, held that "the type of standard
setting and oversight exercised by a franchisor does not rise to the
requisite level of control to constitute joint employer status." 165 And in
People v. Domino's Pizza,1 66 a New York trial court in October 2020

dismissed the New York Attorney General's joint employer claim
against Domino's Pizza, because of a "clear, nearly unbroken trend ...
that as a matter of law a franchisor is not a joint employer."1 67
To be sure, some courts have rejected a hard presumption against
joint employer liability in franchising, often in denying motions to
dismiss joint employer claims.1 68 But by 2021, franchisors have
successfully refashioned the efficiency-based justification to relax
antitrust law enforcement against franchisors into a presumption of no
franchisor liability for conduct in franchise stores as a majority rule
across employment and employment discrimination laws. In modern
no-poaching antitrust litigation, franchisors' assertions that franchisees
are independent entrepreneurs, and that franchisors and franchisees
have a shared economic interest in franchisor vertical restraints, support
their argument that these mobility restraints are "reasonably necessary
to the promotion of the [franchisor's] brand."1 69
164 Id. at 1030.
165 In re Domino's Pizza Inc., No. 16-CV-2492, 2018 WL 4757944, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 30, 2018); see also In re Jimmy John's Overtime Litig., No. 14 C 5509, 2018 WL
3231273, at *15 (N.D. Ill. June 14, 2018) (similarly relying on Patterson to conclude
that "a showing of corporate guidance in the hiring process, without any personal
involvement in the hiring decisions of individuals seeking employment at a [a franchise
store], is insufficient to demonstrate that [a franchisor] controls the selection of
franchise employees").
166

People v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., No. 450627/2016 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 27, 2020).

167 Transcript of Record at 42, Domino's Pizza, No. 450627/2016. The New York
Attorney General has filed a notice of appeal. Notice of Appeal, James v. Domino's Pizza,
Inc., No. 450627/16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 5, 2021), NYSCEF No. 480.
168

See Johnson v. McDonald Corp., No. 20-CV-1867, 2021 WL 2255000, at *2-3

(E.D. Mo. June 3, 2021); Ocampo v. 455 Hospitality LLC, No. 14-CV-9614, 2016 WL
4926204, at *7-9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2016); Cordova v. SCCF, Inc., No. 13C1V5665,
2014 WL 3512838, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2014); Olvera v. Bareburger Group LLC, 73
F. Supp. 3d 201, 207-08 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Cano v. DPNY, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 251, 257, 259
(S.D.N.Y 2012).
169 Conrad v. Jimmy John's Franchise, LLC, No. 18-cv-00133, 2019 WL 2754864, at
*2 (S.D. Ill. May 21, 2019), motion to certify appeal denied, No. 18-cv-00133, 2019 WL

4596762 (S.D. 111. Aug. 6, 2019) (citing Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino,
Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 338 (2d Cir. 2008)). In antitrust law, no-poaching agreements may
be subject to the less stringent rule of reason rather than a quick look analysis if they
are ancillary to the franchise agreement. Id.; see also Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), Yi v. SK Bakeries, LLC, No. 18-5627 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 11, 2018), 2018 WL
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But these assumptions, that franchisees are independent
entrepreneurs and that franchisor restrictions on franchisee behavior
benefit franchisees, cannot be sustained. Franchisees, in fact, are not
independent entrepreneurs, and franchisors and franchisees often have
misaligned interests. Paul Rubin, writing in 1978, observed that while
franchisees are legally classified as independent contractors, "the
economics of the situation are such that the franchisee is in fact closer
to being an employee of the franchisor than to being an independent
entrepreneur." 170 As explained in Part I, many franchisors limit
franchisee mobility with non-competition agreements, prohibiting
entrepreneurialism that is in the interests of franchisees because it may
limit franchisee
interests. All franchisors
harm franchisor
entrepreneurialism in operating franchise stores by imposing standards
that remove the discretion from franchisees to pursue their own
interests. These restraints often require that franchisees relinquish
control over all manner of store operations. 7 1 The economists cited by
Patterson for the proposition that franchisors and franchisees have a
mutual interest in these restrictions, Roger Blair and Francine
Lafontaine, stress in that same article that "conflicts emerge because the
72
interests of the franchisor and the franchisee are not fully aligned."1
For Blair and Lafontaine, the franchisor's interest is in promoting its
trademark and increasing store revenue, even if franchisor requirements
73
to do this create costs that cut into franchisees' profits.
As contract law scholar Gillian Hadfield explains, franchisors and
franchisees have adverse interests in expanding their own businesses
and limiting competition from other businesses. A franchisee naturally
seeks exclusive jurisdiction over profitable areas, while the franchisor's
interest is in saturating the market to increase revenue, drive out
competitors, and advertise the brand, even if particular units are not
profitable. For the same reasons, franchisors impose standards on
franchisees even if they create costs that cut deeply into franchisee
profits. Franchisors want stores open at all hours, even during times in
which there are few customers and during which franchisees would

5622602 ("In a franchise system like Cinnabon, the franchisor and the franchisee share
a common interest in providing the best Cinnabon-branded products and services.").
170 Rubin, supra note 132, at 232.
mn See Elmore, supranote 2, at 914-26.
172 Roger D. Blair & Francine Lafontaine, Understandingthe Economics of Franchising
and the Laws that Regulate It, 26 FRANCHISE L.J. 55, 55 (2006) (emphasis added). I thank
Marshall Steinbaum for this insight.
173 See id. at 59-60.
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prefer to close in order to save on costs.1 74 Franchisor requirements that

franchisees agree not to own competing businesses, and to operate
franchise stores in geographic areas that place them in competition with
other franchisees or the franchisor for the same customers, and to keep
stores open even when unprofitable, are not at all in the interests of the
franchisees. For these reasons, state franchise and consumer protection
laws often protect franchisee interests from franchisor opportunism in
imposing some restrictions, even though permitted by antitrust law as
procompetitive.1 75
Recent litigation challenging no-poaching agreements as an unlawful
restraint under the Sherman Act reveals that franchisees are not
independent entrepreneurs, and that franchisors and franchisees can
have misaligned interests. Franchisors themselves have grounded their
defense to these claims on a rationale of franchisee dependency, arguing
that franchisors and franchisees are a single enterprise that is incapable
of conspiring in violation of the Sherman Act. 176 Courts have extended
Sherman Act firm immunity to some franchisor-franchisee
relationships, 177 often grounded in the same evidence of indirect control
disregarded in joint employer claims. In Arrington v. Burger King
Worldwide, Inc., for example, the court recognized that the franchisor
imposes on franchisees uniform requirements for compliance with the
franchisor's royalties and advertising payments, and operational
standards, from personnel appearance, training, service and manner of
food preparation, to store image, menu, hours of operation and
equipment.1 78 Finding that this relationship is "totally derivative," and
that the franchisee has "no independent source of power" in this
relationship, the court dismissed the no-poaching claim against Burger
King because of the "unity decisionmaking" of franchisors and
174 Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchisingand the Law of Incomplete
Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927, 950-51 (1990).
175 See Burns, supra note 137, at 622-24.
176 A Sherman Act claim that a restraint is a conspiracy requires a showing of
coordination between multiple actors. The Supreme Court in Copperweld Corp. v.
Independent Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) held that a firm is a single actor incapable
of a conspiracy under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 777; see Sanjukta Paul,
Fissuring and the Firm Exemption, 82 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 70-71 (2019)
(discussing franchisor use of Copperweld single firm immunity defense in no-poaching
litigation).
177 See Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nev., 999 F.2d 445, 447-48 (9th Cir. 1993); see also
Hall v. Burger King Corp., 912 F. Supp. 1509, 1548 (S.D. Fla. 1995). For a criticism of
the logic that the firm immunity doctrine is necessary where companies have common
economic goals, such as franchisors and franchisees, see Paul, supra note 176, at 68-72.

178 Arrington v. Burger King Worldwide, 448 F. Supp. 3d 1322, 1330-31 (S.D. Fla.
Mar. 24, 2020).
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franchisees.1 79 Franchisors in defending against no-poaching claims, far
from contesting this conclusion, often assert their expansive control
over franchise store operations as a defense.1 80 This control that
franchisors claim is necessary in franchising to provide a uniform
presentation of their brands in franchise stores can also distinguish the
franchisor-franchisee relationship from more independent relationships
subject to section 1 Sherman Act liability.1 8 1
Antitrust no-poaching litigation is also instructive in its skeptical
view of the claim that franchisors and franchisees have aligned interests.
As McDonald's economist expert in Deslandes v. McDonald's explained,
"a basic tenet of franchising economics is that franchisors do not benefit
when their franchisees gain market power because franchisees will then
82
sell less of their products, which undermines the brand's growth."1
Franchisors in seeking dismissal of these antitrust claims nonetheless
argue that no-poaching agreements are procompetitive, enabling
franchisors to coordinate with their franchisees in their aligned interest
in interbrand competition.1 83 But most courts have rejected the claim
that franchisors and franchisees have aligned interests in no-poaching
agreements. As the court in Deslandes reasoned, the competition
restrained by no-poaching agreements are not "for the sale of
hamburgers to consumers," but for employees.1 84 McDonald's, like most
franchisors, operates both company-owned and franchisee-owned
stores, and when it does so in the same geographic area, the franchisor
179 Id. at 1331.
180 See Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 9, Arrington, 448 F. Supp. 3d 1322
(S.D. Fla. June 10, 2019) (No. 18-24128-CIV-MARTINEZ/Otazo-Reyes), 2019 WL
4701199 (distinguishing fast food franchisor-franchisee relationship from that of sports
franchises, because fast food franchisor "controls almost all aspects of its franchisees'
restaurant operations").
181 As the Supreme Court held in rejecting firm immunity for National Football
League franchises, even closely associated firms can conspire if "the agreement 'deprives
the marketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking."' Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l
Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 195 (2010).
182 Deslandes v. McDonald's USA, LLC, No. 17 C 4857, 2021 WL 3187668, at *10
(N.D. 111. July 28, 2021) (concluding that because monopsony power enables
franchisees to make more profit but sell fewer products, it "is terrible for the franchisor,
who wants to increase output of hamburgers and fries").
183 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Deslandes, 2021 WL 3187668
(No. 17 C 4857). Cinnabon, for instance, argued that its no-poaching agreements could
not violate the Sherman Act, because they promote "interbrand competition between
rival businesses, with Cinnabon and its franchisees working together to compete against
other companies for customer sales and loyalty." Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), Yi v. SK Bakeries, LLC, No. 18-5627 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2018), 2018 WL
5622602.
184 Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955, at *6-8.
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and its franchisees "are direct, horizontal, competitors."1 85 Other courts
following this reasoning have denied motions to dismiss because
franchisors and franchisees can be involved in a joint venture and yet
have separate, adverse interests. 186
In sum, Patterson and courts

that rely on Patterson impose a

presumption against joint employment in franchising based on
assumptions of franchisee independence and franchisee aligned
interests with franchisors. As explained in this section, neither
assumption is justified. Franchisees depend on franchisors for their
business and can be harmed by the contractual restraints imposed on
them by franchisors. Courts - and franchisors themselves - have
acknowledged this reality in current antitrust litigation. This should be
sufficient for courts to reject the presumption against joint employment
for franchisors. Contrary to conventional wisdom, franchising presents
no special circumstances that warrant a presumption against joint
employment status.
Franchisor assertions of single firm immunity in antitrust litigation
raises the question of whether plaintiffs can introduce these claims as
admissions of joint employer status in employment and employment
discrimination law litigation. Andrele Brutus St. Val argues that a
franchisor's single firm claim "arguably entails a concession that they
exercise control over the franchisee's employment and personnel
matters," and so should be considered by courts in joint employer
claims.1 87 This is an intriguing suggestion, 188 but my aim here is
185 Before denying plaintiffs' motion for class certification, the court in Deslandes
found that allegations of no-poaching agreements were sufficient to state an antitrust
claim, despite the franchisor's fear "about training and then losing employees." Id. at
*8. As the court reasoned, "every employer" fears losing employees, and has options
other than "unlawful market division ... includ[ing] paying higher wages/salaries and
contracting directly with each employee to set an employment term." Id.
186 SK Bakeries, 2018 WL 8918587, at *3 (denying motion to dismiss because
franchisor and franchisees "are capable of conspiring under § 1" of the Sherman Act);
see also In re Papa John's Emp. & Franchisee Emp. Antitrust Litig., No. 18-CV-00825,
2019 WL 5386484, at *6-10 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 21, 2019); Blanton v. Domino's Pizza
Franchising LLC, No. 18-13207, 2019 WL 2247731, at *4 (E.D. Mich. May 24, 2019)
(finding no-poaching agreement allegations sufficient to support a claim of unlawful
horizontal restraint); Conrad v. Jimmy John's Franchise, LLC, No. 18-cv-00133, 2019
WL 2754864, at *2-3 (S.D. Ill. May 21, 2019), cert. denied, No. 18-cv-00133, 2019 WL
4596762 (S.D. 111. Aug. 6, 2019) (denying motion to dismiss because claim requires
further factual development, including "the relative independence of Jimmy John's
franchisees").

187

See St. Val, supra note 55, at 318.

188 While some courts might consider this a prior inconsistent statement, as St. Val
explains, many courts would reject a party's legal brief as an admission in a subsequent
case. Id. at 279 & n.251 (collecting cases). Even if taken as an admission, this would
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different. It is to show that courts should not look to efficiency
arguments from antitrust law in presuming that contractors are not
joint employers. Doing so ignores economic research and antitrust
litigation suggesting the contrary, and undermines the remedial goals
of employment and employment discrimination law.
The next section will offer a framework grounded in franchisee
dependency to guide the joint employment analysis.
B.

CenteringSubordinate Firm Dependence with Presumptions in the
Joint Employment Doctrine

Rejecting the presumption against joint employment in franchising
should lead courts to consider the power that franchisors have over
franchise store operations by virtue of franchisee dependency. 189 But,
while current joint employer standard doctrines and their multi-factor,
totality of the circumstances tests can account for how much
90
subordinate firms depend on lead firms for continued operations,1
extending current doctrine in this way is unlikely to make enough of a
difference.191 Instead, courts should center subordinate firm

not be dispositive, as many courts presume that a parent is not a joint employer of a
subsidiary's employees. Lusk v. Foxmeyer Health Corp., 129 F.3d 773, 778 (5th Cir.

1997).
189 Elmore & Griffith, supra note 3, at 152.

190 Mobility limitations inform the joint employer factors of (1) "the permanence or
duration of the working relationship," (2) "the extent to which the work is an integral
part of the employer's business," and (3) "opportunity for profit or loss." Salinas v. Com.
Interiors, Inc., 848 F.3d 125, 150 (4th Cir. 2017); see also Rutherford Food Corp. v.
McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1947); Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 67 (2d
Cir. 2003) (quoting Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1058-59 (2d Cir.
1988)). The permanence of the relationship can show the subordinate firm's
dependency on the lead firm for continued operation. See Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 72425, 731. Integration of the workers' work into the putative joint employer's coordinated
production, likewise, can show that the subordinate firm cannot exist as a separate
business organization apart from its relationship with the lead firm. See id. at 729-30;
Goldstein et al., supra note 69, at 1143-44. Lead firm requirements that subordinate
firms agree not to compete with the lead firm can show limited opportunity for gain or
loss. See Schultz v. Capital Int'l Sec., Inc., 466 F.3d 298, 309 (4th Cir. 2006) (finding
that a non-compete agreement is evidence of joint employer status); In re Baez, 41
N.Y.S.3d 146, 148 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (affirming employer status of franchisor based
on substantial evidence of control, including requirement of non-compete agreement
from franchisee).
191 As Dubal and Zatz explain, this approach to weighing evidence of joint
employment invites judicial line-drawing exercises and lead firm restructuring to avoid
joint employer status. Dubal, supra note 16, at 794; Zatz, supra note 11, at 281, 289.
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dependency by applying presumptions.1 92 This section will explain how
courts can restructure the control-based joint employer test to do this.
I will then propose extending the ABC test presumption of employment
status to lead firms like franchisors in which subordinate firms have no
independently established occupation or trade in the next Part.
A presumption that centers dependency in the current joint employer
standard can begin with an initial inquiry into the mobility limitations
imposed by the lead firm on the subordinate firm. Upon an initial
finding that a lead firm significantly limits the mobility of its
subordinate firm, a court can presume that the lead firm jointly employs
the subordinate firm's employees. This presumption is justified by the
power of lead firms to shape their subordinate firms' workplace because
of the subordinate firm's dependence on the lead firm for economic
survival. In a control-based joint employment standard, the lead firm
can rebut this presumption by showing that it does not reserve or
exercise control over the workplace despite the subordinate firm's
limited mobility.
This approach to centering subordinate firm dependency takes the
concept of identifying economic relationships that merit heightened
scrutiny from Zheng, and refashions it as a presumption, as in Patterson,
but inverted in favor of joint employment status. A presumption in favor
of employment status is central to the ABC test, which the California
Supreme Court used in Dynamex to distinguish between employment
and independent contractor relationships,1 93 and which I discuss as
applied to joint employment infra Part III. Here, the presumption that a
lead firm is a joint employer of employees of subordinate firms is
grounded in the control that lead firms can reserve and exercise by
virtue of the subordinate firm's limited mobility.1 94

192 This is similar to the approach of the California Supreme Court in Dynamex
Operations W. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018), which shifted the burden under
state wage and hour law to the hiring entity to show that the worker is an independent
contractor and not an employee. Id. at 41-42. Hiba Hafiz also proposes a presumption
of joint employment status for lead firms like franchisors that "impose any servicerelated quality control provisions in franchising and licensing agreements with their
direct employer." Hiba Hafiz, The Brand Defense, 43 BERKELEY J. EMPL & LAB. L.
(forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 52).
193 Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 34-36.
194 Tanya Goldman and David Weil similarly argue in favor of shifting the burden in
claims of misclassification of employees as independent contractors to the defendant to
show "attributes of business operation that connote the activity of an independent
business entity." Tanya Goldman & David Weil, Who's Responsible Here? Establishing
Legal Responsibility in the Fissured Workplace, 42 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 55, 111

(2021).
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In franchising, the initial finding of the subordinate firm's limited
mobility can be shown in the franchise agreement. Limiting
independent business ventures, imposing price and geographic
limitations and myriad operational requirements, and requiring upfront
capital equipment, supplies, and products, backed by the lead firm's
unilateral and expansive right to terminate and not renew the
relationship, all lock subordinate firms into a relationship of
dependency. 195 They limit opportunities for profit and loss, and
demonstrate both the permanence of the working relationship and that
the subordinate firm is an integral part of the lead firm's business. High
upfront fees, required capital investments in franchise stores, and
unilateral franchisor termination rights, show the franchisee's
dependency on the franchisor for the continued operation of the
business. The franchisees' skills, capital, assets, and other business
operations are also relevant in a determination of dependency.
Franchisees that have no plausible economic choice but to continue
operating a franchise store are more likely to follow franchisor
recommended and required policies as if the franchisor were a joint
employer. These mobility limitations enable the lead firm to integrate
the subordinate firm's employees in its production process, with limited
opportunity for the subordinate firm to realize a profit or loss
independent of that relationship.
A threshold finding that a franchisee depends on its franchisor for
economic survival justifies shifting the burden to the franchisor. The
franchisor can rebut the joint employer presumption by showing that
these mobility limitations nonetheless do not provide the franchisor
with "overall influence and power to co-determine the work" in
franchise stores. 196 This could be shown, for example, with a showing
that the franchisee can ignore mobility limitations in the franchise
agreement without fear of adverse consequences.
Viewing mobility limitations as a form of dependency can guide
courts to identify, as Zheng proposes, economic arrangements that
Franchisor-imposed
scrutiny." 197
heightened
attract
"should
geographic limitations or required hours of operation, for example,
constrain franchisee discretion about delivery radius and work shifts. A
franchisee who is dependent on the franchisor for her economic
livelihood is more likely to remain open at times that no customers
patronize the store because the franchisor demands it, and to remain in

195

Hadfield, supra note 174, at 934.
Elmore & Griffith, supra note 3, at 1368.
197 Zheng, 355 F.3d at 73.
196
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a geographic area despite nearby franchisor store openings that siphon
customers from the store.
Ongoing franchisor monitoring,
communications, and evaluations of franchisee store practices,
alongside franchisor-recommended workplace practices, likewise,
permit franchisors to shape the workplace practices of franchisees
dependent on franchisor approval for their continued operation. 198
Franchisors that reserve and exercise these forms of control in franchise
store workplaces should bear the burden to show that they are not joint
employers.
This approach would, additionally, enable courts to find extreme
mobility restraints like required non-compete and no-poaching
agreements dispositive on the question of joint employment. A lead firm
that imposes a no-poaching agreement exerts direct control over hiring,
a core employer responsibility. Non-competition agreements that
preclude competition with the lead firm during the term of the
agreement can effectively convert subordinate firms into managers for
the lead firm. They permit franchisors to directly control franchise store
employees, using franchise store managers as intermediaries, as they
would their own managers. 199 They are extreme mobility restraints that
require no further showing of control to establish a joint employment
relationship.
To be sure, centering subordinate firm dependency by applying
judicial presumptions in favor of the joint employer status is more likely
to find franchisors to be joint employers. And extending a presumption
of joint employment to many franchisors requires overcoming a familiar
judicial bias against extending liability to parties that did not directly
cause the harmful conduct. 200 But, on balance, extending joint
employment liability on the ground of subordinate firm dependency is

198 Elmore & Griffith, supra note 3, at 1351-52, 55 (explaining examples in which
franchisors evaluate franchisee staffing and expect franchisees to use the franchisor's
scheduling software, to lower labor costs).
199 As Kati Griffith explains in her intermediary theory of employment, lead firm
control of subordinate firm managers enables control over employees by influencing
hiring and firing, staffing, and training. Kati L. Griffith, An Empirical Study of Fast-Food
FranchisingContracts: Towards a New "Intermediary" Theory of Joint Employment, 94
WASH. L. REV. 171, 187-98 (2019).
200 This is a common objection to enterprise liability in tort law. See, e.g., James A.
Henderson, Jr., Civil Liability for Encouraging Bad Behavior: From Cheering at A Gang
Rape to Promoting Opioid Abuse, 71 FLA. L. REV. 123, 153 (2019) (arguing that "courtmade enterprise liability has never taken hold in this country" because it is
"unmanageable, inefficient, and unfair").
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fair, even if it sweeps in borderline cases. 201 It would avoid pricing
franchise store employees out of litigating meritorious claims, and hold
lead firms liable for practices in their control that they can deter. It
would permit these firms to reduce liability for subordinate firm
conduct out of their control with insurance and indemnity agreements
202
and by imposing capital requirements on subordinate firms.
Whatever increased costs borne by franchisors must be balanced against
its deterrence value, the shifting of costs away from vulnerable workers,
and the removal of incentives to restructure operations as a form of
regulatory arbitrage.
Even without a presumption, centering subordinate firm dependency
has important implications in current joint employer doctrine, not just
for franchising but also for other economic relationships. Reserved
and
surveillance,
workplace
remote
in contracts,
control
of
features
common
are
recommendations that are effectively required,
203
are
contracts
cost-plus
While
companies with buyer market power.
204
lead
often rejected as evidence of a joint employment relationship,
to
use
them
firms with the power to limit subordinate firm mobility can
operational
effectively set wages. And while courts often reject detailed
instructions and inspections for quality control 205 as control measures,
lead firms can use them to supervise employees. In these cases, a focus
on subordinate firm dependency can guide a court to weigh these terms
as forms of control.

201 See Goldman & Weil, supra note 194, at 102 (arguing that presumption of
employment status in misclassification claims is "predictable, easier to administer, and
produc[es] fewer disputed outcomes").
202 See Elmore, supra note 2, at 955-56.
203 See Carrillo v. Schneider Logistics Trans-Loading & Distrib., No. 11-cv-8557,
2014 WL 183956, at *16 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2014) (finding that the power Wal-Mart
had over a subcontractor led the subcontractor to understand that Wal-Mart's
recommendations could be understood as requirements/directives).
204 See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.3d 1195, 1220 (D.C. Cir.
2018) (distinguishing cost-plus contracts, which are a standard feature of contracting
relationships, and other forms of indirect control that can show a joint employment
relationship); Int'l Longshoremen's Assoc. Local 1937 v. Norfolk S. Corp., 927 F.2d
900, 903 (6th Cir. 1991) ("A cost-plus contract, by itself, does not establish a joint
employer relationship.").
205 See, e.g., Lepkowski v. Telatron Mktg. Grp., 766 F. Supp. 2d 572, 579 (W.D. Pa.
2011) (explaining courts have frequently held detailed instructions and strict quality
control will not on its own indicate an employment relationship); Jacobson v. Comcast
Corp., 740 F. Supp. 2d 683, 690 (D. Md. 2010) ("[D]etailed instructions and close
monitoring are key components in many independent contractor and franchise
relationships.").
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Some courts have already moved toward broadening the joint
employment doctrine. It is consistent with how some courts have
accounted for the dependence of subordinate firms on national retailers,
such as Amazon and Wal-Mart. Edmonds v. Amazon.com, Inc.,206 found
that Amazon's permanent relationship with a delivery company, and its
employee's job of delivering packages for "the largest digital retailer in
the United States," demonstrated permanence and integration. 207 This
justified giving significant weight to Amazon's indirect control, such as
its "exact schedule that dictates the order of delivery and provides the
exact route to utilize," as well as required trainings and uniforms, and
flat rate of pay, which were sufficient to allege a joint employer
relationship. 208 Similarly, in Carrillov. SchneiderLogistics Trans-Loading
& Distribution, Inc., 209 the trial court held that Wal-Mart could jointly
employ its warehouse subcontractor's workforce because Wal-Mart's
integration of the subcontractor made its employees dependent on WalMart's overall production process. 210 This permitted a broad
interpretation of Wal-Mart's screening requirements, approved staffing
levels, and productivity standards as forms of indirect control. 211 It also
justified considering Wal-Mart's "suggestions about how to improve
productivity" as evidence of control because of the expectation that the
subordinate firms "would follow these suggestions." 212
Edmonds and Carrillo evince a judicial receptivity to a broad joint
employment standard if the lead firm has significant buyer market
power over its subordinate firms, even lacking the mobility restraints
common in the franchise relationship. I will return to this theme, and
the need for administrative guidance about how buyer market power
can show a joint employment relationship, in Part IV(C).
Lastly, centering dependency can establish joint employment status
for those franchisors that use extreme mobility restraints even in some
states with franchisor-shield laws. At least five of these eighteen states
create exceptions that no-poaching and non-compete requirements can
satisfy. A court applying the narrow "directly and immediately" control
test in Michigan and Louisiana can find that a franchisor no-poaching
requirement permits the franchisor to directly control hiring, and that
a non-compete requirement allows franchisors to directly supervise
206 No. C19-1613, 2020 WL 1875533 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 15, 2020).
207

Id. at *4-6.

208 Id. at *5.
209 No. 11-CV-8557, 2014 WL 183956 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2014).
210 Id. at *12.
211
212

Id.
Id.
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employees through intensive monitoring and evaluation. This may even
satisfy the "atypicality" exception to the franchisor exemption in Texas,
Utah, and Wisconsin, to the extent that the mobility restraint is not
widely used.
FRANCHISEE DEPENDENCY JUSTIFIES PRESUMING THAT
FRANCHISORS ARE JOINT EMPLOYERS UNDER THE ABC TEST
III.

The dependency of franchisees on franchisors for continued
operation can also justify a presumption of joint employment
notwithstanding judicially-recognized forms of control in many of the
twenty-two states that presume employment status in their employment
213
laws in some version of the ABC test (named for its three elements).
For example, California presumes that covered workers are employees
unless the hiring entity establishes three separate elements of
independence, or prongs A, B, and C, as follows:
(A) The person is free from the control and direction of the
hiring entity in connection with the performance of the work,
both under the contract for the performance of the work and in
fact. (B) The person performs work that is outside the usual
course of the hiring entity's business. (C) The person is
customarily engaged in an independently established trade,
occupation, or business of the same nature as that involved in
the work performed. 21 4
It is an open question whether the ABC test applies to the joint
employment doctrine. The ABC test does not limit its scope to direct
employment. Some courts have broadly construed it to include joint
216
on the ground that requiring a
employers, 215 including franchisors,
Anna Deknatel & Lauren Hoff-Downing, ABC on the Books and in the Courts: An
Analysis of Recent Independent Contractorand MisclassificationStatutes, 18 U. PA. J.L.
Soc. CHANGE 53, 58-60 (2015) (explaining that New Jersey, Massachusetts, and
Connecticut use a similar "ABC" test to determine if an entity is an employer in their
states' wage and hour laws).
214 CAL. LAB. CODE § 2750.3(a)(1)(A)-(C) (repealed 2020); see also Dynamex
Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P. 3d 1, 7 (Cal. 2018).
215 See Moreno v. JCT Logistics, Inc., No. EDCV 17-2489, 2019 WL 3858999, at *7
(C.D. Cal. May 29, 2019) (applying Dynamex to both putative direct and joint
employers).
216 The Massachusetts Supreme Court reasoned in Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising
Int'l, Inc., 465 Mass. 607 (2013), that the ABC test can apply to franchisors who contract
with "master franchisees" to hold the contracts with workers classified as independent
contractors. Id. at 623-25; see also Haitayan v. 7-Eleven, Inc., No. CV 17-7454, 2020
WL 1290613, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2020) (denying franchisor summary judgment
&

213
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direct contractual relationship would afford the franchisor an "end run"
around the statute. 217 But the ABC test primarily responds to the
misclassification of employees as independent contractors, 2 18 which was
the claim in Dynamex. Courts have found that the ABC test does not
apply in workplaces in which the worker is already an employee. 219 The
Ninth Circuit in Salazar v. McDonald's flatly held that Dynamex "has no
bearing here, because no party argues that Plaintiffs are independent
contractors." 220 Since the franchisee employed plaintiffs, "the relevant
question is whether they are also McDonald's' employees." 221
Judges may be reluctant to extend the ABC test to presume joint
employer status because of a fear that this will unfairly sweep in all
companies that hire subcontractors. 222 In fact, asking whether a
subordinate firm is "customarily engaged in an independently
established trade," - prong (C) of the ABC test - can measure the
power of lead firms to shape subordinate firm workplaces without
sweeping in all contractors. Subordinate firms that have no independent
business depend on the lead firm for their economic livelihood - a
motion on the ground that material disputes of fact existed under either ABC or
multifactor test).
217 Depianti, 465 Mass. at 623-24.
218 See Shu-Yi Oei, The Trouble with Gig Talk: Choice of Narrative and the Worker
ClassificationFights, 81 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 126 (2018).
219 Henderson v. Equilon Enters., 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d 738, 751-54 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019)
("Dynamex was concerned with the problem of businesses misclassifying workers as
independent contractors so that the business may obtain economic advantages that
result from the avoidance of legal and economic obligations imposed on an employer
by the wage order and other state and federal requirements."); see also Curry v. Equilon
Enters., 233 Cal. Rptr. 3d 295, 311-14 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (finding that the public
policy reasons supporting the Dynamex decision are not present in a joint employer
claim because "taxes are being paid and the worker has employment protections").
220 Salazar v. McDonald's Corp., 944 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2019).
221

Id.

222 Henderson, 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 751-54 (rejecting application of the ABC test to
joint employment because prong C, requiring a showing that the worker is involved in
an "independent occupation or trade," would effectively deem all contractors joint
employers in claims in which the individual is already an employee of a direct
employer). Prong A as applied to joint employment in Martinez does not raise an
overbreadth concern. Martinez held that on-site inspections and supervision for quality
control and reserved power to cancel orders for inferior quality were insufficient to
establish a joint employer relationship. Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259, 281-82 (Cal.
2010). As with the traditional multi-factor test discussed in Part 11, the breadth of prong
A hinges on whether the court broadly considers indirect control. See, e.g., Torres v. Air
to Ground Servs., No. CV 13-03164, 2014 WL 12564098, at *3-6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 2,
2014) (finding FedEx to be a joint employer of a subcontractor's delivery workers, based
on similar quality control measures as in Martinez, and the subcontractor having
previously informed FedEx about its unlawful pay practices).
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justifiable case for joint-employer status. Courts in states that use the
ABC test may presume that franchisors are joint employers, and find in
favor of the franchise store employee unless the franchisor produces
evidence that the franchisee operates an independently established
trade. This approach is consistent with the approach affirmed in
Martinez v. Combs, 223 of supplementing the control-based test with
other measures of joint employment that are often ignored in judicial
interpretations of control.
Applying this version of the "independently established trade" test to
franchisors would effectively overrule the presumption against
224
franchisor joint employment in Patterson, and may extend joint
225
employment liability to many, if not most, fast food franchisors. But
franchisors that do not require or recommend workplace practices or
limit franchisee mobility, and that permit franchisees genuine
independence in their operation of franchise stores, could meet this
version of the independently established trade test. It would not sweep
in parties with standard arms-length business agreements. Companies
that contract out to independent contractors that perform ancillary
services would satisfy the independently established trade test because
the lead firm does not regularly engage in the ancillary service and the
independent contractor owns its own, independent business. So long as
the companies do not integrate dependent subordinate firms in their
operations, they would not be considered joint employers under this
prong of the ABC test.
While extension of the ABC test to joint employment raises the same
fairness concerns as detailed in Part II(B), a fairness analysis must
consider the fairness of the current regime for subordinate firm
employees. A control-based joint employment test requires complex,
costly litigation that prices out plaintiffs with individual, low-value
claims, and shifts the costs of legal noncompliance to them if the
subordinate firm is judgment proof. It also creates few incentives for
lead firms to require and monitor legal compliance. As the court in
Depianti argued, exempting companies that do not directly contract

223 The approach affirmed in Martinez supplements the control test with a
nondelegable duty for contractors to prohibit illegal workplace practices they are aware
of and have the power to stop. Martinez, 231 P.3d at 281-82.
224 As the Ninth Circuit held in Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int'l, Inc., 939 F.3d
1045 (9th Cir. 2019), this is in order because, "reliance on Patterson and the 'special
features of the franchise relationship' was misplaced." Id. at 1048.
225 Most franchisors are "hybrid," both operating their own stores and franchising
others, and cannot claim that the franchisees' business is "outside" the franchisor's
normal business. JEFFREY L. BRADACH, FRANCHISE ORGANIZATIONS 51-59 (1998).
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with workers from the ABC test creates an incentive to hire a labor
intermediary such as a franchisee to avoid labor and employment law
obligations. 226 Extending the ABC test to joint employment would
promote legal compliance, shift the costs of noncompliance away from
vulnerable workers, and deter regulatory arbitrage. If courts refuse to
extend the ABC test to joint employment relationships because of
perceived unfairness to lead firms, these benefits justify legislative and
administrative reform to overcome this judicial bias, a theme I will
return to in Part IV.

Lastly, the Lanham Act, which regulates franchisor trademarks and
protects against unfair and deceptive practices, 227 does not preempt
application of a presumption of joint employer status to franchisors. 228
The Lanham Act does not expressly preempt state law or occupy the
field of the franchise relationship, 229 and the ABC test is not an obstacle
to federal franchise regulation. 230 As the Ninth Circuit reasoned in
InternationalFranchiseAssociationv. City of Seattle,23 1 state employment
226 Before the passage of Proposition 22, Uber considered converting to a franchise
system in order to avoid an employer status under the ABC test. See Mulvaney & Smith,
supra note 105. That question will likely reoccur if the trial court decision finding
Proposition 22 unconstitutional is affirmed on appeal, and with the push for ABC test
exemptions in other states.

227

15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018).

228 Historic police powers of the states, such as workplace regulation, are presumed
not to be superseded by federal law absent a showing that this is "the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress." Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 558, 565 (2009) (quoting Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 585 (1996)); see also Int'l Franchise Ass'n v. City of Seattle,
803 F.3d 389, 410 (9th Cir. 2015) (applying the presumption against preemption to
state workplace regulation). The Lanham Act contains no such statement of purpose.
See 16 C.F.R. § 436.1 (2021). The FTC, moreover, has never suggested that the Lanham
Act preempts state workplace regulation, and the FTC Franchise Rule expressly
disclaims an intent to preempt state law unless inconsistent with the regulation. Id.
§ 436.10(b) ("The FTC does not intend to preempt the franchise practices laws of any
state or local government, except to the extent of any inconsistency with part 436.").
229 See City of Seattle, 803 F.3d at 409; Attrezzi, LLC v. Maytag Corp., 436 F.3d 32,
41 (1st Cir. 2006); Mariniello v. Shell Oil Co., 511 F.2d 853, 857 (3d Cit. 1975).
230 As the Third Circuit explains, the purpose of the Lanham Act was "so that the
public can buy with confidence, and the trademark holder will not be pirated."
Mariniello, 511 F.2d at 858. State laws do not conflict with the Lanham Act unless they
directly interfere with or regulate marks. The Fourth Circuit, for example, upheld state
limitations on the hours of operations, rent, and number of outlets a franchisor could
require in a franchise agreement with a franchisee against a Lanham Act obstacle
preemption suit. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Va. Gasoline Marketers & Auto. Repair Ass'n, Inc.,
34 F.3d 220, 223-26 (4th Cir. 1994). For an example of a common law infringement
claim that is preempted by the Lanham Act, see Kiva Health Brands LLC v. Kiva Brands
Inc., 439 F. Supp. 3d 1185, 1198-99 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
231 803 F.3d 389 (9th Cir. 2015).
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standards do not implicate the Lanham Act because they do "not
interfere with a franchise's ability to maintain quality, compromise the
public's confidence in trademarks, allow misappropriation, or directly
interfere with or regulate marks." 232
For these reasons, a recent suit by the IFA, claiming that the Lanham
233
does not offer a
Act preempts application of ABC test to franchisors,
234
But the suit is nonetheless
persuasive case for obstacle preemption.
instructive because it illuminates the true stakes in the controversy. In
it, the IFA seems to assert that the Lanham Act enshrines franchising as
a special economic relationship that will be disrupted by the designation
235
of franchisors as joint employers in the ABC test. This claim, though
23 7
236
contestable, is familiar. Franchisors have
and factually
legally
justification to avoid workplace
efficiency
of
this
pursued versions
success in Patterson. But it
recent
with
1970s,
the
since
regulation
some cost. Such a sweeping
imposes
proves too much. All regulation
theory of preemption would invalidate any employment law that might
232 Id. at 409-10. In City of Seattle, the IFA claimed that the Lanham Act preempted
an ordinance that requires larger employers to comply with a new minimum wage
before smaller employers, and classifies franchise stores as larger businesses if those
franchisor's franchisees together meet the large employer threshold. Id. at 397-98.
233 See Complaint at 22, Int'l Franchise Ass'n v. California, No. 20-CV-02243 (S.D.

Cal. Nov. 17, 2020), ECF No. 1.
234 The strongest claim IFA offers is that the FTC Franchise Rule requires franchisors
to maintain their trademarks in ways that, it argues, should not be considered control
in the joint employment doctrine. But the FTC Franchise Rule and guide, while offering
that franchisors provide control and assistance to franchisees, use these terms
interchangeably, and define them as including activities peripheral to the ABC test. The
FTC Franchise Rule and guide, moreover, expressly state that they are not binding on
the FTC, and express no opinion about whether franchisors are joint employers. See 16

C.F.R. § 436.1 (2021);

FED. TRADE COMM'N, FRANCHISE RULE COMPLIANCE GUIDE,

at ii,

15 (2008).
233 This is, in substance, the same argument that franchisors and their advocates
pursued in arguing against the NLRB's Browning-Ferris rule for joint employment,
which considers the indirect control exerted by franchisors in the joint employer
analysis. See, e.g., David J. Kaufmann, Felicia N. Soler, Breton H. Permesly & Dale A.
Cohen, A Franchisor Is Not the Employer of Its Franchisees or Their Employees, 34
FRANCHISE L.J. 439, 467-468 (2015) (offering the FTC Franchise Rule as evidence that
a finding that a franchisor is a joint employer is contrary to state and federal franchise
regulation).
236 A trademark does not entitle its owner to engage in "quality control" free from
state regulation. See Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo, 150 F.3d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 1998)
(reasoning that "'quality control' is not a talisman the mere utterance of which entitles
the trademark owner to judgment").
237 Joint employer status only creates franchisor liabilities if franchisees do not
indemnify franchisors for them, which franchisors can prevent with capital
requirements for franchise applicants and indemnity clauses in franchise agreements.
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subject a franchisor to liability. As explained in Part II(A), Patterson is

grounded in unwarranted assumptions about the franchise relationship,
and should be rejected on its own terms. And courts have, correctly,
declined franchisors' invitation to convert the Lanham Act and FTC
Franchise Rule into a form of Lochnerism. 238
IV.

LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY PROPOSALS TO ACCOUNT FOR
SUBORDINATE FIRM DEPENDENCY IN THE JOINT EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE

To address mobility restraints that lead firms impose on subordinate
firms to shape workplace practices, employment law needs to move past
a narrow definition of control. This project can benefit from, and in
some cases require, statutory and regulatory reforms. While courts can
account for mobility restraints in the joint employment doctrine (or
ABC test), courts are reluctant to jettison formal indicia of control as its
core test. As a result, courts minimize subordinate firm dependency,
even when applying the ABC test.239 And courts must find that
franchisors are not joint employers in fourteen of the eighteen states
with franchisor shield laws, which either categorically exclude
franchisors or only permit a joint employment finding with the
franchisor's consent. 2 0
This Part makes three proposals to address mobility limitations in the
joint employer standard
in employment and employment
discrimination law: (1) a legal presumption in federal law that a lead
firm is a joint employer unless the subordinate firm is customarily
engaged in an independently established business or trade; (2) a per se
rule that lead firms that impose mobility restraints, such as no-poaching
and non-compete agreements, on their subordinate firms are joint
employers; and (3) agency enforcement, guidance, and coordination to
regulate lead firms that shape subordinate firm workplaces by limiting
subordinate firm mobility.
238 See, e.g., Fleming v. Matco Tools Corp., No. 19-CV-00463, 2020 WL 6461327, at
*4 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2020) (rejecting defendant's invitation to "restore[] some of
the Patterson'gloss' insofar as it makes clear that franchises employ a unique business
model, the very existence of which relies on uniformity in the relationships between
franchisors and franchisees").
239 Even when applying a broader standard, such as the ABC test, courts can
narrowly interpret those prongs in order to require a showing of judicially recognized
forms of control. See, e.g., Curry v. Equilon Enters., 233 Cal. Rptr. 3d 289, 314-15 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2018) (minimizing ABC test to find that Shell, a lessor which established a
quasi-franchise relationship with its gas station lessee, did not jointly employ the gas
station manager because the plaintiff "worked at an independent business and Shell did
not exercise control over her").
240 Grow & Saltz, supra note 99, at 370.
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A Federal "Independently EstablishedOccupation or Trade" Test

A broad, durable standard that extends joint employment liability to
lead firms that limit the mobility of subordinate firms in order to shape
their workplaces will require law reform. Legislation can guide courts
in subjecting specific economic relationships to greater scrutiny. The
ABC test has shown the value of independent, overlapping rules to
apply a broad definition of employment to different economic
relationships. As explained infra Part III, prong C of this test, presuming
a joint employment relationship absent a showing that the
subcontractor is involved in an "independent occupation or trade,"
would extend joint employment liability to lead firms that hire
subordinate firms with no independent business outside the lead firm's
production process. Extending joint employment liability to these lead
firms would improve legal compliance, shift the costs of noncompliance
away from vulnerable workers, and deter regulatory arbitrage, without
courting overbreadth concerns.
Other recent innovations to expand the employment definition are
less tailored to subordinate firm dependence. The non-delegable duty
from Martinez would require a showing that the lead firm had reason to
24
be aware of the illegal conduct to be a joint employer. 1 This would
exclude lead firms without notice of the illegal conduct, even if those
the power to set the
lead firms had - and benefitted from subordinate firm's work terms. While appropriate for economic
relationships in which the subordinate firm operates an independent
business, a notice requirement is unnecessarily restrictive for lead firms
that shape the workplaces of dependent subordinate firms.
Prong B of the state ABC test, the "outside the usual course of the
hiring entity's business" test, in contrast, would extend joint employer
status to all franchisors that require franchisees to use their business
24 2
for example, a
formats. In Awuah v. Coverall North America, Inc.,
Massachusetts trial court applying the ABC test found this prong
dispositive. The court held that contrary to Coverall's claim that it is a
"distribution system," that Coverall "sells cleaning services, the same
services provided" by the franchisees. 243 Similar defenses by business
format franchisors, and other lead firms that hire subordinate firms to
produce and distribute their products and services, would likely be

241 See Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259, 281-82 (Cal. 2010)
defendants had no notice of violations).
242 707 F. Supp. 2d 80 (D. Mass. 2010).
243 Id. at 84.

(finding that
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rejected on the same ground. This test would essentially deem these
entities to be guarantors of their subordinate firms' work law practices.
Deeming all franchisors joint employers can be justified by the antidomination principle of extending co-liability to lead firms to protect
workers from poor or degrading work conditions. 244 Lead firms that
benefit from their dominance over subordinate firms deserve to be held
responsible for the negative consequences of their relationships,
particularly if subordinate firms frequently violate employment law and
are judgment proof.245 On these grounds, some states deem garment and
construction lead firms "guarantors" of their subordinate firm
employees' wages. 246 The United States House of Representatives
introduced the Worker Flexibility and Small Business Protection Act of
2020247 to extend this approach to franchising. This approach is more
predictable and efficient than a rebuttable presumption, and can be
justified in the fast food sector, in which subordinate firms are often
judgment proof and frequently violate employment and employment
discrimination law. 248 But this approach is more susceptible to
overbreadth criticisms. For this reason, the independently established
occupation or trade test is a more plausible extension of joint employer
doctrine, at least in the near term.

244 Rogers, supra note 22, at 500-01.
245 Enterprise liability in tort law has been justified on similar fairness grounds. See
Gregory C. Keating, Rawlsian Fairness and Regime Choice in the Law of Accidents, 72
FORDHAM L. REv. 1857, 1886-87 (2004) (arguing that "the burdens of accidental injury
should be distributed across those who benefit from the risks which result in those

injuries").
246 California recently passed the Garment Worker Protection Act, which holds
garment manufacturers, their contractors, and any "brand guarantor," jointly and
severally liable for their subcontractor's wage and hour law violations. S.B. 62 (Cal.
2021); Press Release, Governor Newsom Signs Legislation Creating Nation-Leading
Worker Protections for Garment Industry, Additional Measures to Combat Unfair Pay
Practices and Improve Workplace Conditions (Sept. 27, 2021), https://www.gov.ca.gov/
2021/09/27/governor-newsom-signs-legislation-creating-nation-leading-workerprotections-for-garment-industry-additional-measures-to-combat-unfair-pay-practicesand-improve-workplace-conditions/
[https://perma.cc/WD23-UW79].
California,
Maryland, and New York extend guarantor status to general contractors for owed wages
of their subcontractors in the construction industry. CAL. LAB. CODE § 218.7 (declaring
that general contractors on private construction projects "assume, and [are} liable for
any debt" of a subcontractor for unpaid wages); MD. CODE ANN. § 3-507.2 (2021); S.B.
2766, 244th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021); see Christine Pulfrey, New York
Contractors to Be Liable for Subcontractors'Wage Theft, BLOOMBERG TAX (Sept. 7, 2021,
11:52 AM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/payroll/new-york-contractors-to-be-liablefor-subcontractors-wage-theft [https://perma.cc/J7TY-B3QM].
247 H.R. 8375, 116th Cong. (2020).
248 See Elmore & Griffith, supra note 3, at 1318 & n.1
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As with the ABC test, the independently established occupation or
trade test should not supplant other tests that extend liability to putative
joint employers on other grounds. The control test and non-delegable
duty from Martinez would extend joint employment coverage to other
relationships regardless of dependency, while the outside the usual
course of the hiring entity's business test addresses the problem of
misclassification of employees as independent contractors. While these
tests can overlap, as with the different prongs of the state ABC test, they
are additive in nature and should not undermine complementary
liability regimes.
B.

Per Se Rule that Lead Firms that Require No-Poachingand NonCompete Agreements Are Joint Employers

Federal and state law should incorporate a per se rule that lead firms
that use non-competition and no-poaching agreements with their
subordinate firms are joint employers. While a per se rule of joint
employment is foreign to the traditional control test, it is familiar to
antitrust law, and would serve a similar purpose here. In antitrust law,
per se categories are narrow and considered per se illegal because they
are consistently anticompetitive. The FTC and the U.S. Department of

Justice's Antitrust Division, for instance, issued guidance in 2016 that
24 9
no-poaching agreements can be per se violations of antitrust law.
Marinescu and Posner, likewise, propose a per se standard for contractor
restraints that have consistently anticompetitive effects, including nopoaching agreements. 250
Non-competition and no-poaching agreements are two classes of
mobility restraints that should fall within a per se rule of joint employer
status. A lead firm that requires a subordinate firm to enter into a nopoaching agreement exerts direct control over a core employer
responsibility, while non-competition agreements can effectively
25
convert franchisees into managers for the franchisor. 1 In both cases, a
per se rule is in order, because they are strong enough evidence of
considerable control. States with franchisor shield laws would have to

249 U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN

RESOURCE PROFESSIONALS 3 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/903511/download
[https://perma.cc/BTQ5-GG6R}.
250 Marinescu & Posner, supra note 4, at 1382-93.
251 See supranote 199.
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amend those laws to include this per se rule. This would align these
statutes with a bipartisan, rising concern about private domination. 252
C.

Agency Enforcement, Guidance, and Coordinationto Address
Harmful Effects of Mobility Limitations on Workers

This Article has argued that existing doctrinal tools can account for
mobility limitations in joint employment tests. This analysis has
important implications for administrative agencies considering claims
that a franchisor is a joint employer. Even though constrained by its
current "direct and immediate" joint employer rule, the NLRB could
consider franchisors to be joint employers if they use no-poaching, noncompete, or other mobility restraints that evince "direct" or
"immediate" control. The EEOC, and DOL, which recently rescinded
its similarly-narrow Trump-era DOL joint employer regulation, 253 could
take account of a broad range of mobility limitations in administrative
guidance. While DOL is likely to revisit the Obama-era Administrator's
Interpretation ("Al") from 2016,254 that Al did not specifically discuss
the franchise relationship or address the relevance of subordinate firm
dependency. 255 DOL can improve on its 2016 Al by clarifying that a
presumption against joint employment in franchising is unsound, and
that it will presume that lead firms that limit the mobility of subordinate
firms are joint employers in its own enforcement actions. DOL guidance
could, furthermore, offer specific features of the franchise relationship
that make a joint employment relationship more likely, such as mobility
restraints like no-poaching and non-compete requirements, reserved

252 Ben Casselman & Jim Tankersley, Looking for BipartisanAccord? Just Ask About
Big Business, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/14/
business/economy/big-business-politics-economy.html [https://perma.cc/NWZ4-6KZ4].
This would track recent antitrust law reform efforts, which have sought to reorient
antitrust law to check private domination. See Lina M. Khan, The End of Antitrust History
Revisited: The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age, 133 HARV. L. REv. 1655,
1682 (2020); Zephyr Teachout, Antitrust Law, Freedom, and Human Development, 41
CARDOZO L. REV.

1081, 1104 (2020).

253 Rescission of Joint Employer Status Under the Fair Labor Standards Act Rule, 29

C.F.R. § 791 (2021).
254 See Ben Penn, DOL Proposes Ditching Trump's Narrowed Joint Employer Rule (1),
BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 11, 2021, 5:52 AM), https-/news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-laborreport/biden-dol-proposes-ditching-trumps-narrowed-joint-employer-rule [https//perma.cc/
LXX8-ACJX].
255 See U.S. Dep't of Lab., Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter on Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) (2016), at 2-4 (instructing that in vertical joint employment inquiries, the
focus is on the relationship between the employee and the putative joint employer,
rather the relationship between the putative joint employers to each other).
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control in franchise agreements, "recommended" personnel policies
accompanied by adverse consequences for franchisees who do not adopt
them, and intensive, ongoing monitoring, communications, and
evaluations.
Further administrative enforcement, guidance and coordination is
needed, moreover, to account for subordinate firm dependence on lead
firms outside of the franchise relationship. Companies like Amazon and
Wal-Mart have significant buyer market power to shape the workplace
practices in their subordinate firms, even without the mobility restraints
that are common in franchising. Since 2013, seeking to wrest control
over delivery schedules and volume from the major ground delivery
companies, Amazon has established its own transportation division to
256
direct shipments through "delivery service partners," or DSP's.
Amazon shifts the costs and responsibilities of employing drivers to
257
DSP's by designating them as the direct employer of the drivers.
Coordinating deliveries through 1,300 startup DSP's, which work
almost exclusively for Amazon, has also allowed Amazon to embed
significant control in its contracts with DSP's. DSP's, for instance, must
install Amazon tracking and surveillance technology in DSP vans,
require drivers to use specific delivery routes set by an Amazon
algorithm, and follow detailed, uniform Amazon personnel policies for
these drivers, including required pay and benefits, hygiene, and social
media use. 258 Wal-Mart has controlled warehousing subcontractors'
hiring practices in similar ways, and, like franchisors, makes personnel
259
recommendations that it expects subcontractors to follow.
These practices can harm workers in ways that echo the violations of
employment and employment discrimination law common in the
franchise relationship. Shifting the legal responsibility for delivery
safety to DSP's, for instance, permits Amazon to provide DSP's with
detailed safety instructions but bear no liability when DSP's instruct
drivers to bypass them in order to meet Amazon's productivity

256 BRAD STONE, AMAZON UNBOUND: JEFF BEZOS AND THE INVENTION OF A GLOBAL

EMPIRE 225-29 (2021).
257 Id. at 228 (explaining that Amazon established its DSP network to lower labor
costs, as a potent union avoidance strategy, and to shift the cost of "botched deliveries,
driver misbehavior, or worse, car accidents and deaths" away from Amazon).
258 Josh Eidelson & Matt Day, Amazon Work Rules Govern Tweets, Body Odor of
ContractDrivers, BLOOMBERG L. (May 5, 2021, 3:00 AM PDT), https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2021-05-05/amazon-work-rules-govern-tweets-body-odor-of-contractdrivers thttps://perma.cc/E344-NDTGI.
259 See Carrillo v. Schneider Logistics Trans-Loading & Distrib., Inc., No. 11-CV8557, 2014 WL 183956, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2014).
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requirements. 260 Courts, as in Edmonds, may consider the subordinate
firm's dependency as enabling lead firm control. 261 But this approach is
only easy to apply in cases, like Wal-Mart and Amazon, in which the
defendants' buyer market power is uncontested.
There is a need for DOL guidance about how lead firms can shape
workplace practices in joint employment claims outside of judiciallyrecognized forms of control, including buyer market power. Economic
research to measure buyer market power in joint-employer claims can
expand its reach, 262 but is too expensive and complex for most
individual, private employment and employment discrimination
litigation. Employment and employment discrimination law claims
would benefit from a simplified approach to assess the buyer market
power of putative joint employers, 263 and for agency guidance about
how courts should weigh buyer market power in the joint employer
analysis. Coordination with the FTC can expand agency expertise in
measuring buyer market power and will be necessary to deter mobility

260 Annie Palmer, Amazon Delivery Companies Routinely Tell Drivers to Bypass Safety
Inspections, CNBC (July 30, 2021, 12:20 PM EDT), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/07/30/
amazon-dsps-tell-drivers-to-bypass-safety-inspections.html [https://perma.cc/B9LHD2541. Amazon has been widely criticized for prizing speed over safety practices in
deliveries. Amazon DSP's report high rates of driver and pedestrian injuries and deaths,
for which Amazon has been held harmless. James Bandler, Patricia Callahan, Doris
Burke, Ken Bensinger & Caroline O'Donovan, Inside Documents Show How Amazon
Chose Speed over Safety in Building Its Delivery Network, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 23, 2019,
3:00 PM
EST), https://www.propublica.org/article/inside-documents-show-howamazon-chose-speed-over-safety-in-building-its-delivery-network
[https://perma.cc/
N645-F33P]; Patricia Callahan, Amazon Pushes Fast Shipping but Avoids Responsibility
for the Human Cost, N.Y. TIMEs (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/05/
us/amazon-delivery-drivers-accidents.html [https://perma.cc/2DKB-PY23].
261 In Edmonds, Amazon's permanent relationship with a delivery subcontractor,
and
its employee's job of delivering packages for "the largest digital retailer in the United
States," demonstrated permanence and integration. Edmonds v. Amazon.com, Inc., No.
C19-1613, 2020 WL 1875533, at *4-6 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 15, 2020).
262 Callaci, supra note 10, at 418; Hafiz, supra note 18, at 703. Economists and law
scholars have made similar calls to measure buyer market power in antitrust challenges.
See Marinescu & Posner, supra note 4, at 1345-46; Naidu et al., supra note 35, at 53940, 574-83 (proposing economic analysis to determine market definition and
concentration, and to measure downward wage pressure).
263 One proposed change to New York law prohibits abuse of a lead firm's labor
market power. It would relieve a plaintiff from having to define the relevant market in
state antitrust suits, by deeming firms that employ over thirty percent of employees in
an occupation as having "labor market dominance." The bill would, additionally,
remove the defense in an antitrust claim that an abusive practice has procompetitive
effects. The bill passed the state senate but did not become law in this legislative session.
See S.B. 933A, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021).
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restraints that violate antitrust law 264 and the lead firm use of mobility
26 5
restraints that harm workers classified as independent contractors.

DOL guidance and coordination with the FTC and state agencies can
also inform DOL's strategic enforcement of wage and hour law.
Misclassification task forces, coordinated by DOL until 2016 and active
in at least fourteen states, 266 show the potential of inter-agency
coordination in addressing lead firm dominance over subordinate firms
and their employees. 267 State agencies in multi-agency coordination
could recommend law reform in their state joint employer tests to
account for the power of lead firms to set their subordinate firms' work
terms, outside of judicially recognized forms of control.
CONCLUSION

Mobility limitations are a significant source of power for lead firms to
control their subordinate firms' employees. However, while recognized
in economics and increasingly in antitrust law, they are often ignored
in employment and employment discrimination law. This Article
proposes that taking account of mobility limitations can correct a trend
in which courts presume that franchisors and other lead firms that
embed control in mobility limitations are not joint employers. It can
also justify a presumption of joint employment, either by restructuring
the control-based joint employer doctrine or by extension of the
264 DOJ and FTC issued guidance in 2016, for example, that no-poaching agreements
can be per se unlawful under antitrust law. U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM'N,
supra note 249, at 3. DOL and FTC have previously coordinated in investigating a wideranging conspiracy by poultry producers to fix worker wages at unlawfully low rates.
Robin van der Meulen & Brian Morrison, An Update on Anti-Poach Enforcement and
Class Actions, LAw360 (July 11, 2018, 4:39 PM EDT), https://www.law360.com/
articles/1062322/an-update-on-anti-poach-enforcement-and-class-actions [https-/perma.cc/
6497-X59R].
265 See Amazon to Pay $61.7 Million to Settle FTC Charges It Withheld Some Customer
(Feb. 2, 2021),
Tips from Amazon Flex Drivers, FED. TRADE COMM'N
2
https-/www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/ 021/02/amazon-pay-617-million-settle-ftccharges-it-withheld-some [https://perma.cc/GK3Y-9H4Q].
266 ANDREW ELMORE & MUZAFFAR CHISHTI, MIGRATION POLY INST., STRATEGIC
LEVERAGE: USE OF STATE AND LOCAL LAwS TO ENFORCE LABOR STANDARDS IN IMMIGRANT-

DENSE OCCUPATIONS 5 (Migration Policy Inst. 2018).
267 Those task forces permitted participating enforcement agencies to use data
housed across other state agencies for strategic enforcement, and to recommend
broadening of state employment laws to an ABC test to state legislatures. Id.; Deknatel
& Hoff-Downing, supra note 213, at 64; see, e.g., The New York State Construction
Industry Fair Play Act, S. 5847 (N.Y. 2009) (using the ABC test in the construction
industry in New York State because of the recommendation of its misclassification task
force).
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presumption of employment in the state ABC test to joint employers.
Shedding light on the harmful effects of mobility limitations on
workers, finally, suggests a law reform agenda of regulating subordinate
firm dependency, notwithstanding judicially recognized forms of
control.

***

